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BEYOND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: INCREASING 
NOTICE OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
Brian M. Murray * 
INTRODUCTION 
Jason Lawson1 is a twenty-five-year-old African American male 
with a criminal record. 2 He is currently unemployed despite pos-
sessing a high school diploma and an associate's degree from a lo-
cal, urban community college, which is more higher education 
than the vast majority of his neighbors. 3 He plans to earn his 
bachelor's degree in the evening once he finds steady employ-
ment. 
* Abraham Freedman Fellow and Lecturer-in-Law, Temple University, Beasley 
School of Law; J.D., 2011, magna cum laude, Notre Dame Law School; B.A., 2008, Philos-
ophy and Political Science, summa cum laude, Villanova University. I would like to ex-
press my gratitude for the comments of Professor Rick Greenstein and Professor Jennifer 
Mason McAward while drafting this article. I also would like to extend a heartfelt thank 
you to my wife, Katherine, for her unyielding support, my daughter Elizabeth, for her in-
spiring wonder and curiosity in all things, and my entire family, for their unconditional 
love, continuous patience, and enduring encouragement. 
1. The following account is a fictional scenario based on the author's experience as a 
practicing attorney in both the criminal defense and employment law contexts. 
2. Mr. Lawson, as an African American male, is sadly somewhat average when it 
comes to his criminal record. Statistics indicate that disproportionate shares of African 
American males have some type of criminal record, whether that means a conviction or an 
arrest record. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., NCJ 
197976, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, 5-6 (Aug. 
2003), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piuspOl.pdf. See generally Erica 
Goode, Many in U.S. Are Arrested by Age 23, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, at 
Al6 (noting 30.2% of twenty-three-year-olds surveyed reported having been arrested for 
"an offense other than a minor traffic violation," compared to 22% who made a similar re-
port in a 1965 study). This has caused the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC") to conclude that some employment practices may have a disparate impact on 
African Americans and Latinos. EEOC GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST 
AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (Apr. 25, 2012) [hereinafter EEOC, GUIDANCE], available at http: 
//www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm. 
3. Only roughly 20% of African Americans over twenty-five possessed a college de-
gree as of 2010. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL AnSTHACT OF nm UNITED STATES: 
2012 151 tbl.229 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables 
/12s0229.pdf (statistic under the table titled, "Educational Attainment by Hace and His-
panic Origin: 1970 to 2010"). 
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Lawson lives in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was born and 
raised in North Philadelphia, which is one of the poorest areas of 
the city. The product of a disjointed household, Lawson was a star 
football player at his high school; however, he did not have the 
funds to supplement a partial scholarship to a Division I college. 1 
As will be explained below, he also had a felony conviction at the 
age of eighteen. Therefore he did not leave the city, instead trying 
to pay his way through the local community college. 
After Lawson graduated from high school, he spent the sum-
mer working odd jobs to earn some money. One of Lawson's co-
workers sold marijuana. Lawson purchased some for personal use 
on a few occasions but never shared it with anyone. On one occa-
sion, while riding in his co-worker's van to the next job, the police 
stopped the van for running a red light. During the stop, the po-
lice learned that the co-worker's driver's license had been sus-
pended due to a prior Driving Under the Influence ("DUI") convic-
tion. Because the driver would be taken into custody, the officers 
asked Lawson if he could remove the vehicle from the roadway. 
An urbanite his entire life, Lawson responded that he did not 
have a license. The officers decided to impound the vehicle and 
conduct an inventory search.5 The officers located ten pounds of 
packaged marijuana in the trunk. 
Lawson and his co-worker were arrested at the scene and 
charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled sub-
stance. 6 Lawson's bail was set at $50,000. Unable to post this 
amount, he sat in a Philadelphia prison for nine months while his 
case continued to be re-listed for trial. Without funds to hire pri-
vate counsel, his overworked, court-assigned public defender7 
4. See generally Jerry Carino, Athletes, Administrators Debate Scholarship Stipends, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/09/28/ath 
letes-administrators-debate-ncaa-scholarship-stipends/2890117/ (describing how even full-
scholarship student athletes can face financial difficulty). 
5. See generally South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372-76 (1976) (describing 
the proper bases and considerations to justify an inventory search pursuant to arrest); 
Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 255 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (citing Opperman 
factors when determining validity of an inventory search). 
6. See generally 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 780-113(a)(30) (2013). 
7. Charges that result in actual incarceration entitle a defendant to the right to 
counsel under the United States Constitution. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 
(1979). In Pennsylvania, the right to counsel is the same as that guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amenclment. See Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. 1999). For more discus-
sion on the fecleral right to counsel, see infra Part III. 
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(who changed with each court appearance) sought to negotiate a 
plea, notwithstanding the glaring suppression and trial issues 
within the case.8 One of those attorneys was able to negotiate a 
time-served guilty plea with two years of probation to follow. 9 
Tired of waiting for resolution of his case and anxious to return to 
his once promising life, Lawson accepted the offer. 10 
At no point during his stay in jail, conversations with his at-
torney, or colloquy before the judge did anyone mention the col-
lateral consequences of a felony conviction. 11 Unfortunately for 
Mr. Lawson, neither the individual players involved, nor the sys-
tem itself, notified him that he will likely struggle to find em-
ployment his entire life12 and that his conviction would categori-
cally bar him from entering certain professions, not to mention 
pursuing other privileges available to non-felons, such as owning 
a firearm, voting, or running for political office. 13 Mr. Lawson 
might struggle to even work as a janitor at a local public school 
with children under the age of thirteen. 14 
8. Specifically, whether the inventory search was valid and whether Lawson "know-
ingly" possessed the marijuana in the trunk. 
9. This is a fairly mild sentence for a possession with intent to deliver conviction. 
Although it does not carry a mandatory minimum sentence in Pennsylvania, unless fire-
arms are involved, sentences can involve multiple years in prison. See PENN. COMM'N ON 
SENTENCING, SENTENCING IN PENNSYLVANIA: 2013 ANNUAL REPORT app. at 128, available 
at http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/annual-reports/2013/view. 
10. See generally Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. 
L. REV. 603, 605-07 (1956) (discussing how the lowest-level courts in Philadelphia valued 
the rapid disposition of cases). While this article is nearly sixty years old, the volume of 
cases processed in Philadelphia has not decreased. 
11. Sec generally John D. King, Beyond "Life and Liberty''.· The Evolving Right to 
Counsel, 48 HAHV. C.R.-C.L. L. RFN. 1, 23 (2013) ("The hidden consequences of a conviction 
may not ever be explained to the person choosing to plead guilty, leading to unjust results 
that happen more regularly and more severely than ever before."). Drug crimes carry myr-
iad consequences. See also Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253 (2002) [hereinafter 
Chin, Race]. 
12. See generally MICHELLE N. RODHIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NA'I"L EMP'T LAW 
PIW.JECT, 65 MILLION "NEED NOT APPLY": THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 1-2 (2011), available at http://www.nelp.org/page 
/-/65_million_need_not_apply.pdf?nocdn=l (indicating that individuals with criminal rec-
ords will struggle obtaining jobs). 
13. See Hugh Lafollette, Collateral Consequences of Punishment: Civil Penalties Ac-
companying Formal Punishment, 22 J. APPLIED PHIL. 241, 241-42 (2005). 
14. See 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1-lll(e)(2) (1992) (listing felony convictions under ''The 
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act" as prohibitive under section (a), 
which includes janitorial positions). The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court recently an-
nounced three decisions impacting the fate of this law. Croll v. Harrisburg Sch. Dist., 
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The twin realities of a criminal justice system dominated by 
guilty pleas and legislatures increasing the consequences associ-
ated with a criminal conviction place someone like Mr. Lawson in. 
no-man's land for the rest of his life. Although fairly resourceful 
up to the point of his conviction and hopeful for a better future, 
Mr. Lawson is now facing significant uphill battles for a liveli-
hood. In that sense, it is not clear that the punishment fits the 
crime. Although he possesses a criminal conviction, he is perhaps 
most guilty of being-through no fault of his own-somewhat le-
gally illiterate when it comes to the non-financial and indirect 
implications of his felony guilty plea. 
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Missouri v. Frye15 and 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 16 while failing to usher a sea change in right-
to-counsel jurisprudence, suggest that the Court is becoming 
more aware of the costs of a criminal conviction. 11 Frye recognizes 
the prevalence of guilty pleas and the need for adequate repre-
sentation in the bargaining context; 18 Padilla acknowledges that 
some collateral consequences, like deportation, are significant 
enough to require a warning for a defendant's counsel to be con-
sidered effective. 19 Perhaps most importantly, they solidify devel-
oping jurisprudence that recognizes the importance of notice 
within the criminal system, albeit through attorneys. 
In the wake of both decisions, many commentators have called 
for an expansion of the right to counsel, especially for defendants 
facing charges that do not carry the threat of incarceration, in or-
der to address the myriad collateral consequences associated with 
a criminal record.20 The premise of the argument is that counsel is 
2012 WL 8668130, at *7, *13 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012) (finding that 24 PA. STAT. 
ANN.§ 1-lll(e)(l) violates substantive due process rights guaranteed by Article 1, Section 
1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, but rejecting the argument that it violates the Ex Post 
Facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution); Johnson v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 
59 A.3d 10, 25 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (finding 24 PA. STAT. ANN.§ 1-lll(e)(l) unconstitu-
tional as a violation Johnson's substantive due process rights under Article 1, Section 1 of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution); Jones v. Penn. Delco Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 8668277, at *7, 
*13 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012) (same finding as Croll). 
15. 566 U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
16. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
17. But see United States v. Muhammad, 747 F.3d 1234, 1235 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2741 (2014) (finding "the law does not require a defendant to be in-
formed of the collateral consequences of a plea"). 
18. Frye, 566 U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
19. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374. 
20. See King, supra note 11, at 36-48. 
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the silver bullet necessary to craft plea deals that avoid such con-
sequences. A defense counsel driven solution would likely miti-
gate the number of unknowing-and perhaps unintelligent-
pleas, especially for the unrepresented, and conceivably shift the 
current paradigm. But is it enough? Or do the plea bargain reali-
ties of the criminal system demand something more? Further-
more, would expansion of the right to counsel continue to place 
too much of the burden on already overworked defense attorneys 
and unknowing defendants, represented or not? Are there other 
players within the system that can and should help? 
This article responds to these questions by focusing on the pri-
mary roots of this justice issue, namely the prevalence of guilty 
pleas and the continued efforts of legislatures to increase the life-
long price of a conviction. Part I begins with a discussion of these 
practical realities within the criminal justice system. Part II then 
examines the law of guilty pleas under the Fifth Amendment, in-
cluding constitutional standards for valid pleas, and how current 
jurisprudence fails to account for the collateral consequences 
mentioned in Part I. Part II also discusses the right to effective 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, post-Padilla 
and Frye, and concludes that the spirit of both cases is the in-
creased notice of collateral consequences, albeit through defense 
counsel. Part III describes the current state of the law on the 
right to counsel and analyzes the merits and shortcomings of ex-
panding the right to counsel in order to address the problem of 
collateral consequences. Finally, Part IV offers a few solutions 
that are more systemic in nature, in contrast to total reliance on 
the attorney-client relationship, and that involve the judiciary 
and prosecutors. Part IV also proposes new disclosure obligations 
for the judiciary and the prosecution because any system-wide so-
lution to the growing effect of collateral consequences must in-
clude the various players involved. 
I. REALITIES OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The realities of the criminal justice system as they pertain to 
the effect of a criminal conviction are stark. Guilty pleas are the 
primary source of convictions, which occur at an incredible rate 
following the initiation of charges. These convictions result in 
myriad, immediate, and direct consequences, as well as shadow 
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consequences that continue to affect offenders for the rest of their 
lives. Although the number of collateral consequences has in-
creased dramatically over the years, knowledge of their scope and 
breadth is lost on various players within the system. This section 
explains how these twin realities, namely the prevalence of guilty 
pleas and increasing collateral consequences, coupled with wide-
spread consequence illiteracy amongst players within the system, 
demands a response. 
A. The Prevalence of Guilty Pleas 
Guilty pleas are the norm rather than the exception when it 
comes to resolving criminal cases. The most recent statistics from 
the federal government suggest that almost 97% of federal cases 
result in a plea.21 The numbers in state systems are comparable: 
the same percent of felony filings in the seventy-five largest coun-
ties in the United States resulted in pleas.22 These pleas often 
come early in the process and are disproportionately entered by 
defendants in custody. 23 
Pleas became commonplace over time. Although the common 
law was skeptical of bargaining to induce admissions of guilt,21 
the simultaneous effects of over-criminalization25 and resource 
scarcity led to the plea becoming the most efficient outcome for all 
parties in an overwhelmed criminal justice system.26 The en-
forcement of broader-reaching statutes resulted in significantly 
21. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL YEAR 
2011 a (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research·and-publica 
tions/research-publications/2012/FYl 1_ 0verview _Federal_ Criminal_ Cases. pdf. 
22. See Jenny Hoberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Conse-
quences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators," 
9:3 MINN. L. HEV. 670, 682 n.59 (2008). 
2:3. ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, THREE-
MINU'l'E JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA'S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 15 (2011). 
24. Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant's Dilemma: An 
Innovative Empirical Study of Plea-Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 10:3 J. CRIM. L. & 
CmMINOLOGY 1, 7 n.:39 (201:3). 
25. See King, supra note 11, at 17-18 (discussing how the "broken windows" theory of 
policing emerged in the 1980s and dramatically reduced police discretion in enforcement of 
statutes). 
26. See Foote, supra note 10, at 64&-44 (recognizing efficiency as the primary reason 
for the adjudication of low-level offenses). Several years before, by the Great Depression, 
as one commentator has noted, plea-bargaining emerged as a crucial response to the 
overwhelmed system. Dervan & Edkins, supra note 24, at 10. 
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more criminal defendants in low-level prosecutions, thereby tax-
ing local courts and forcing prosecutors and criminal defendants 
to act expeditiously. 27 In 2006 alone, roughly 10.5 million misde-
meanor prosecutions occurred. 28 
While pleas became the common practice on the ground, by the 
second half of the nineteenth century they also received the im-
primatur of notable institutions. The American Bar Association 
("ABA") sought to justify the paradigm shift by highlighting how 
pleas allowed courts to focus their energies on cases where the 
presumption of innocence actually mattered.w While that point 
may be true on a theoretical level, the shift also had the effect of 
inverting the otherwise well-known burden of proof within the 
criminal system. 30 The system began to expect defendants to 
plead rather than exercise their trial rights. In fact, exercising 
the procedural protections afforded to defendants would likely re-
sult in mass upheaval within the system.31 Perhaps unknowingly, 
27. See Dervan & Edkins, supra note 24, at 9 ("As the number of criminal statutes-
and, as a result, criminal defendants-swelled, court systems became overwhelmed."); see 
also K. Babe Howell, Brohen Lives from Brohen Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive 
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 271, 281 (2009) (compar-
ing New York City's 86,000 non-felony arrests in 1989, prior to the introduction of the 
city's strategy of Zero Tolerance Policing, with the 176,000 non-felony arrests in 1998, af-
ter the strategy had been implemented); King, supra note 11, at 20 ("As the numbers have 
increased over the past few decades, the tension has increased: 'broken windows' policing 
has led to more arrests, which has led inexorably to more prosecutions, which has led in 
turn to larger caseloads on prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges."). 
28. RonERT c. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR 
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: 'l'HE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMEIUCA'S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR 
Comns 11 (2009). 
29. Dervan & Edkins, supra note 24, at 11 (quoting Arvl. BAH Ass'N, PROJECT ON 
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CHIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDAHDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 2 
(1967) ("[T]he limited use of the trial process for those cases in which the defendant has 
grounds for contesting the matter of guilt aids in preserving the meaningfulness of the 
presumption of innocence.")). 
30. See EmK LUNA & MAIUANNE L. WADE, THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 22 (2012) (noting how the crime control model "begins from a presumption of 
guilt and an overriding faith in the administrative processes that precede the bringing of 
the formal charge in court"). 
al. King, supra note 11, at 21 ("If every defendant charged with a misdemeanor were 
to insist meaningfully and fully on her rights-not only to counsel and a trial, but also to 
the presumption of innocence, compulsory process, confrontation rights, and all of the oth-
er formal procedural safeguards to which she is entitled-the system of criminal prosecu-
tion would have to undergo enormous change in response."); see also Donald A. Dripps, 
Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN. 
S·r. L. REV. 1155, 1155-56 (2005) ("The distinction between substance and procedure per-
vades academic thinking all the way down to the foundations .... [i]n trial-level court-
houses, however, the distinction fades, as the defendant trades his procedural rights for 
1146 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1139 
the Supreme Court of the United States helped to codify the "ne-
cessity" of plea-bargaining in Brady v. United States, which out-
lined the operative standard for determining the legitimacy of 
pleas.32 'rhe sentencing guidelines used by federal and state 
courts, designed to rectify sentencing disparities, also indirectly 
contributed to the culture of pleas because prosecutors could es-
sentially manipulate charges to reach a desired sentencing 
range.33 Prosecutors also could determine sentencing recommen-
dations based on whether a defendant chose to take a plea or pur-
sue a trial, often resulting in a trial penalty.31 
Modern scholarship has shed light on perhaps the most trou-
bling aspect of the plea culture: the willingness to admit guilt, de-
spite innocence, due to extraneous factors. In other words, the 
plea has become the rational choice irrespective of the merits of 
the actual criminal case, simply by virtue of the fact that fighting 
charges results in various types of costs to a criminal defendant, 
not the least of which could be his or her liberty pre-trial. 35 The 
once sacrosanct assumption that trials provided the ultimate 
backstop for determining truth has met actual practice. 
In a careful study conducted by Lucian E. Dervan, roughly six 
out of ten innocent study participants took a plea deal. 36 More 
than half of the innocent participants would take the deal regard-
less of the leniency of the sentence, which suggests that addition-
al factors, such as time, reputation, and other anterior interests 
motivate guilty pleas.37 The system seems to recognize the risk-
averse nature of criminal defendants and turns the plea into a 
reductions in his substantive liability."). 
32. 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970); see infra Part II.A. 
33. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TIUUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 17 (2003); see also Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-
Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 
1128 (2011) [hereinafter Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market] ("A range of pos-
sible overlapping charges can fit a single transaction or episode, and prosecutors have dis-
cretion to choose among them to reflect their own senses of justice, their desires to achieve 
pleas, or any number of reasons."). 
34. See Dervan & Edkins, supra note 24, at 14--15 n.88-89. 
35. See Russell D. Covey, Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and 
the Variable Standard of Proof, 63 FLA. L. REV. 431, 450 (2011) ("When the deal is good 
enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the dice, regardless of whether one believes the evi-
dence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and regardless of whether one is factu-
ally innocent."). 
36. Dervan & Edkins, supra note 24, at 33-34. 
37. See id. at 36-38. 
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self-reinforcing, rational expectation for new defendants entering 
the system.:is Refusing to plead guilty can become the irrational 
choice, especially to defendants who are unaware of indirect con-
sequences down the road. 39 
B. Increasing Collateral Consequences 
A collateral consequence, as defined by courts and commenta-
tors, is a ramification that is indirect, inexplicit, or implicit, and a 
result of the "fact of conviction rather than from the sentence of 
the court."40 Some collateral consequences are automatic, such as 
in the case of mandatory registration of sex offenders. 41 Others 
are discretionary, such as additional barriers to obtaining a pro-
fessional license. 42 Direct consequences, by contrast, are penal 
sanctions stemming directly from the guilty plea. 43 Examples in-
clude incarceration, fines, probation, and parole, which are all 
controlled by the sentencing court. 44 Most circuit courts connect 
direct consequences to the range of a defendant's punishment, 
which contrasts with the effect of a conviction post-punishment.45 
38. See id. at 38 ("[O]ne needs to be concerned not only that significant sentencing 
differentials might lead felony defendants to falsely condemn themselves through plea 
bargaining, but also that misdemeanor defendants might be pleading guilty based on fac-
tors wholly distinct from their actual factual guilt."); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Misde-
meanors, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1328 (2012) (noting how early guilty pleas are espe-
cially troubling because they are not subject to the "adversarial testing'' that should drive 
criminal adjudication: "a police officer's bare decision to arrest can lead inexorably, and 
with little scrutiny, to a guilty plea"). 
39. See, e.g., Russell Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 79 & n.19, 80 (2009) ("[P]lea bargains will be most generous (and 
therefore most frequently accepted) in cases involving misdemeanors and other less seri-
ous offenses. The process costs expended by defendants will be particularly high relative to 
penalty costs where only minor penalties are involved."). Interestingly and relevant to the 
next part of this article, Covey appears to be talking only about direct consequences. 
40. Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Crim-
inal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. 
L. REV. 623, 634 (2006) (describing the nature of collateral consequences); see e.g., People 
v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 268 (N.Y. 1995) (describing collateral consequences as peculiar 
and often imposed by agencies). 
41. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 9799.13 (2012). 
42. See, e.g., 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 559 (2014) (barber license); id. § 124.1 (dental 
hygienist); id. (real estate broker); id. §§ 1909, 1911 (social worker); id. § 2408(c) (taxi 
driver). 
43. Roberts, supra note 22, at 672-73. 
44. Id. at 672, 689-93. 
45. Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973). One 
hundred and seventy-seven decisions cite Cuthrell for this understanding. Roberts, supra 
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One particularly astute commentator has emphasized how the 
distinction between direct and collateral consequences is mythi-
cal, especially when one considers that a significant number of 
collateral consequences are automatically inflicted. 16 In other 
words, the line between an automatic collateral consequence, 
such as mandatory sex offender registration or a driver's license 
suspension, and a direct consequence, such as a fine, is hard to 
decipher when both stem from the fact of a conviction and occur 
by operation of law. 
Perhaps the only thing rivaling the significance of collateral 
consequences for a defendant is their quantity. Generally speak-
ing, legislatures have increased the number of collateral conse-
quences in the past thirty years or so. 47 Cataloguing these conse-
quences has become a national project. 48 Legislatures have 
limited re-entry options in terms of employment eligibility, un-
dermined custody rights, narrowed access to public benefits such 
as welfare and housing, and imposed barriers to political partici-
pation.49 The result is that a significant percentage of ex-offenders 
continue to feel the effects of their convictions in ways that rival, 
note 22, at 690 n.93 
46. See Roberts, supra note 22, at 689-93; see also Bibas, supra note 33, at 1130 ("The 
neat walls between criminal and civil, and between direct and collateral consequences, 
have steadily eroded in recent years."). 
47. See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAIWLE AND PHISONER 
REENTRY 9 (2003); LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: A REPORT ON STATE LEGAL 
BARRIERS FACING PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 8 (2004), available at http://www.lac. 
org/roadblocks-to-reentry/upload/lacreport/LAC_PrintReport.pdf; see also Chin, Race, su-
pra note 11, at 259-60 (describing several consequences under the federal code). 
48. AM. BAR Ass'N, NATIONAL INVENTORY OF THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONVICTION [hereinafter ABA, NICCC], available at http://www.abacollateralconsequenc 
es.org/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
49. PETERSILIA, supra note 47, at 9 ("Since 1980, the United States has passed dozens 
of laws restricting the kinds of jobs for which ex-prisoners can be hired, easing the re-
quirements for their parental rights to be terminated, restricting their access to public 
welfare and housing subsidies, and limiting their right to vote."); see also LEGAL ACTION 
CTR., supra note 47, at 10 (noting how thirty-seven states allow discrimination in employ-
ment due to arrest records, even if the individual was never convicted). Many commenta-
tors would prefer a significant reduction in the volume of collateral consequences in any 
given jurisdiction. This article proceeds from the assumption that collateral consequences 
are unlikely to be significantly reduced by legislatures anytime soon given that they have 
grown exponentially in the past half century. Thus, the article seeks to propose a frame-
work for alleviating their effect through the adjudication process, which contains the ma-
jor actors that determine the circumstances that ultimately lead to an offender encounter-
ing such consequences. 
2015] BEYOND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 1149 
if not exceed, the direct consequences felt at the time of the actual 
1 50 pea. 
1. Employment 
The most significant collateral consequences-both for the in-
dividual defendant and in terms of societal costs-are arguably 
the barriers to employment that ex-offenders face after pleading 
guilty. The ability to work is at the heart of citizenship and being 
a member of the community.51 While many state laws limit the 
ability of employers to consider criminal records, 52 enforcement of 
such laws is minimal. 53 Furthermore, for every law regulating 
employer hiring and decision-making practices, there are myriad 
laws barring ex-offenders from consideration for certain posi-
tions. 51 Countless others provide employers with extra discretion 
50. See Nora Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Col-
lateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 154 (1999) ("(C]ollateral 
sentencing consequences have contributed to exiling ex-offenders within their country, 
even after expiration of their maximum sentences."); see also King, supra note 11, at 23 
("These collateral consequences often constitute a far more serious form of punishment 
than the direct consequences of a conviction, especially for the many people convicted of 
low-level crimes who are never sentenced to incarceration."). 
51. See JUDITH SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 63-64 
(1991) (discussing the importance of being an "earner" to be a citizen). 
52. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. A.1'/N. § 9125(b) (2012). This statute prohibits employ-
ers from considering felony and misdemeanor convictions unless they are related to the 
applicant's suitability for employment, or in other words, are related to the job at issue. Id. 
See also CAL. LAn. CODE§ 432.8 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-702 (2015); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-79, 46a-80 (2015); GA. CODE ANN.§ 42-8-63 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
378-2.5 (2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-13-3-27 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4710(£) (1997); 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-109 (2001); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21-151B, § 4(9); Mo. 
REV. STAT. § 561.016 (1979); MONT. ADMIN. 24.9.1410 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-2 
(1978); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW. §§ 23-A752, 753 (2007); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.32, 
2953.33, 2953.55 (2014); VA. CODE ANN.§ 19.2-389 (2014); WASH. ADMIN. CODE§ 162-12-
140 (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN.§§ 111.32 et seq., lll.335(1)(c)(l)-(2) (2010). 
53. For example, there is only one reported case for the above-cited law that directly 
corresponds to the suitability for employment issue. See Cisco v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 
476 A.2d 1340, 1343 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). Lack of enforcement, either through private 
right of actions, or by state agencies, remains a problem. See Employment Rights of Work-
ers with Criminal Records, NA'l''L EMP'T LAW PROJ., available at http://www.nelp.org/con 
tent/content_issues/category/employment_rights_of_ workers_ with_criminal_records (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2015) ("Although employers may (to varying legal degrees) consider a work-
er's criminal history as part of the application process, employers often fail to comply with 
a range of federal and state laws that provide fundamental protections against abuse of 
criminal background checks."). Considering that most ex-offenders are struggling to make 
ends meet, it is not surprising that few have pursued costly litigation under an unsettled 
statute. 
54. See CMTY. LEGAL SERV., !NC., LEGAL REMEDIES AND LIMITA'rIONS ON THE 
1150 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49: 1139 
to deny applicants. 55 Coupled vvith federal and -state statutes that 
require criminal background checks and the quick and easy 
availability of such information, the scarlet letter that is a convic-
tion becomes more permanent and brighter for all to see. 56 Fur-
thermore, such consequences have societal costs as well: they can 
slant measurements used to determine societal well-being, such 
as the unemployment rate. 57 
Pennsylvania law,58 like that in most states, lists offenses or 
types of offenses that will preclude employment in a particular 
field. For example, the Older Adult Protective Services Act con-
tained lifetime bans due to certain prior convictions.59 Various oc-
cupations with licensing boards are given broad discretion to re-
fuse licenses to an applicant with a felony or misdemeanor 
conviction.60 These same boards are often required by law to con-
sider convictions and sometimes are prohibited from issuing a li-
EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS IN PENNSYLVANIA 9-12 (updated May 
2014) [hereinafter CLS] (noting how individuals with certain types of convictions cannot 
seek employment as airport employees, at banks, insurance company employees, in long-
term care facilities, in certain security positions, and at schools, even for custodial posi-
tions). 
55. Id. at 13-19 (discussing various fields that may be off limits to those with convic-
tions, including accountancy, architecture, barbering, working in casinos, dental hygiene, 
funeral directing, working in horse stables, car dealing, taxi driving, and social work). 
56. ,Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the 
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 287 nn.40-45 (2011). Stories of old 
criminal convictions coming back to haunt ex-offenders who have steadily rebuilt their 
lives are becoming more well-publicized. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamu-
ra, Op-Ed, Paying a Price, Long After the Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/opinion/paying-a-price-long-after-the-crime.html?_r=O 
(describing an employer's refusal to hire an applicant due to a twenty-five year-old convic-
tion). 
57. BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND lNEQUALI'l'Y IN AMERICA 69-70 (2006). 
58. Because the scenario in the beginning of this article was set in Philadelphia, this 
section will focus its attention on the collateral consequences related to employment in 
Pennsylvania. Although these consequences are unique to this jurisdiction, other state 
laws mirror those in the books in Pennsylvania. See supra note 52 (identifying a Pennsyl-
vania conviction-related statute along with similar laws from several other states). 
59. 35 PA. S'I'AT. ANN. § 10225.503(a) (2014). Under OAPSA, nursing homes, home 
health care agencies, and other workers in long-term care facilities, even if not having di-
rect contact with patients, could not have any theft convictions at any time. See id. § 
10225.103 (2014) (defining "FACILITY" as including the following: "[a] domiciliary care 
home[,] ... [a] home health care agency[,] ... [a] long-term care nursing facility[,] ... [a]n 
older adult daily living center[,] ... [a] personal care home ... "). 'rhis law was struck 
down as a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution in Nixon v. Commonwealth. 839 A.2d 
277, 279 (Pa. 2003). At this time, however, the law has not been amended and enforcement 
remains subject to the priorities of state agencies. 35 PA. STA'l'. ANN. § 10225.503(a) (2014). 
60. CLS, supra note 54, at 13-19. 
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cense to individuals with certain convictions, irrespective of that 
individual's rehabilitation post-conviction or the underlying facts 
in the case.61 Similar prohibitions exist under federal law,62 in-
cluding for employees at airports, 63 banks,61 ports,65 and in pris-
66 ons. 
For further examples, one can simply search the ABA's collat-
eral consequences database, which is a project supported by the 
National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, and the 
United States Department of Justice. 67 The website suggests to 
the interested onlooker that the barriers can seem endless. A 
simple search of employment consequences under federal law 
lists nearly six hundred possible ramifications, including the ina-
bility to file a claim for adverse action based on a conviction. 68 The 
same search locates nearly three hundred employment conse-
quences in Pennsylvania,69 including ineligibility as a dog license 
processor or warden, 70 or as the manager or participant in the 
setup of a bingo game. 71 While the number of job seekers for those 
positions may be small, the law also significantly limits those 
convicted of various offenses from employment in any school in 
any position, including after-hours and custodial positions where 
the amount of potential contact with students may be close to ze-
ro. 72 
The available remedies for denials of employment based on a 
conviction record are limited, although the law is developing at 
both the federal and state level. Many states attempt to limit em-
ployer discretion to some degree by requiring that a conviction, if 
not barring someone from a specific position, only be considered if 
61. Id. at 13. 
62. See e.g. 10 U.S.C. § 986(c)(l) (2000). 
63. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44936(b)(l)(B)(xiv)(IX) (2000); see also 49 C.F.R. §§ 1542.209(d), 
1544.229(d) (2014). 
64. See 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (2012) (prohibiting employment of anyone with a crime of 
dishonesty). 
65. See 46 U.S.C. § 70105(c)(l) (2012); see also 49 C.F.R. § 1572.103 (2014). 
66. 28 C.F.R. § 105.23 (2012). 
67. ABA, NICCC, supra note 48, at Project Description (describing the history of the 





72. See supra note 14. 
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it is related to employment. n In Pennsylvania, the analogous 
statute is fairly untested and the statute does not define how to 
determine whether a conviction relates to a candidate's suitabil-
ity for employment.74 
As for federal standards, many scholars, commentators, and at-
torneys suggest that individuals with convictions may be able to 
pursue disparate impact litigation under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act because African Americans and Hispanics are dispro-
portionately represented in the criminal justice system. 75 While 
this theory has popped up in various courtrooms since the 1970s, 
very few litigants have succeeded. 76 In fact, after 1990, such 
claims were often unsuccessful. 77 In a minor victory for future 
plaintiffs, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit recognized that employment policies must "accurately distin-
guish between applicants that pose an unacceptable level of risk 
and those that do not."78 Despite judicial unwillingness to develop 
73. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 9125(b) (2012); see also supra note 52. 
74. There are very few reported cases under this statute. But see Cisco v. United Par-
cel Services, Inc., 476 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Super. 1984) (construing statute as allowing employ-
ers to only consider felony and misdemeanor convictions). Further, no state agency is as-
signed to enforce the statute, which means that its terms are enforced only through a 
private lawsuit. 
75. See Alexandra Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimination 
Against Minority Men With Criminal Records, 14 BEHKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 2, 4-5 
(2013). 
76. See Green v. Missouri Pac. RR Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1975) (hold-
ing invalid a blanket disqualification based on convictions); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 
315, 326 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that a provision attempting to remedy past discrimina-
tion by removing scrutiny based on past misdemeanor and felony convictions was too 
broad); Dozier v. Chupka, 395 P. Supp. 836, 854 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (holding that the use of 
arrests and convictions favored white men over black men); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of 
America, 332 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. La. 1971) (holding that firing a bellman based on his 
prior conviction of theft was not racially discriminatory under the argument that more 
black persons than white have been convicted of various crimes), aff'd mem., 468 F.2d 951 
(5th Cir. 1972); Gregory v. Litton Sys. Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (holding 
that an employer's policy of not hiring candidates who have multiple arrests without con-
victions had a foreseeable effect of denying black applicants an equal opportunity and was 
hence unlawful), modified on other grounds, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); EEOC Decision 
No. 74-89 (1974); EEOC Decision No. 71-2682 (1971). 
77. See, e.g., Matthews v. Runyon, 860 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (granting sum-
mary judgment against plaintiff for failing to establish a prima facie case); Lewis v. Ala. 
Dep't of Public Safety, 831 P. Supp. 824 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (dismissing due to plaintiffs fail-
ure to make requisite statistical showing); Williams v. Scott, No. 92 C 5747, 1992 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13643 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1992) (noting that defendant established business 
necessity to fire employee from "collector" position). 
78. El v. S.E. Pa. 'l'ransp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 245 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting how empiri-
cal evidence should support an employer's decision to link a conviction to suitability and 
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the theory, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC") recently issued Guidance under Title VII for employers 
to use when considering criminal records.79 The Guidance lends 
credibility to the theory that facially neutral policies could result 
in a disparate impact.80 However, pursuit of such litigation is sub-
ject to all of the usual procedural and substantive hurdles appli-
cable to Title VII, including difficult burdens of proof for a plain-
tiff.81 Furthermore, such litigation would rarely, if ever, provide 
the type of immediate relief needed by a job applicant with a 
criminal record. 82 
2. Public Benefits and Privileges 
Criminal convictions impact eligibility for public benefits and 
privileges otherwise available to a member of the community. 
Convictions can lead to ineligibility for unemployment benefits,83 
loss of retirement benefits for public officials,81 and disqualifica-
tion from welfare, 80 cash assistance,86 and medical assistance.87 
possible job performance). 
79. EEOC, GUIDANCE, supra note 2. 
80. The Guidance disfavors across-the-board exclusions, rejections due to arrest in-
formation, and calls for a three-part analysis for employers to evaluate convictions, includ-
ing the nature and gravity of the offense, the time that has passed since the offense, and 
·the nature of the job sought. Id.; see Part V.B. Furthermore, if an employer seeks to reject 
a candidate, the Guidance calls for an "individualized assessment" involving several other 
factors unique to the applicant's situation. Id. 
81. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (holding that 
burden shift framework applies to employment discrimination cases). The problems of 
proof, especially in a disparate impact case, remain for advocates attempting to establish 
unlawful discrimination on the basis of criminal records. Additionally, it is unclear wheth-
er Title VII actually preempts state regulation of employment practices, particularly in 
this field. Express preemption seems to be off of the table given 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 
(2012). And whether conflict or obstacle preemption is applicable is a fairly untested area 
of the law. But even if Title VII were to survive a preemption challenge, the Guidance it-
self does not maintain the force of law. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142, 144 
(1976) (labeling the EEOC guidelines as "interpretative regulations" whose weight de-
pends "upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control"). 
82. How many ex-offenders have the time, money, or wherewithal to make a federal 
case of it? 
83. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 802(g), 87l(b) (2009). 
84. Id. § 1313(a). 
85. 21 U.S.C. § 862(a)(l)(A) (2012); see 55 PA. CODE§ 141.21(t) (2015). 
86. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4239 (2010); id. § 432.24 (listing eligibility regulations 
for an individual who has been convicted of a controlled substances offense). 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(3) (2012); 55 PA. CODE§ 1101.92(c)(l) (2015). 
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They also can result in forcible eviction from public housing88 and 
the inability to live with someone, related or unrelated, who is 
seeking child custody.89 The effect of strict housing restrictions is 
especially difficult for ex-offenders who may need some additional 
support when transitioning back into living on their own full-
time. Even veterans may lose the ability to reside in state-
operated residences specifically designed for former service mem-
bers.90 Convictions for drug-related offenses can also render stu-
dent loan assistance unattainable.91 For the indigent defendant 
struggling to regain footing, the loss of such public benefits is 
even more significant. When one considers that the vast majority 
of ex-offenders must pay back fines, costs, and other penalties af-
ter a term of incarceration, or risk being re-incarcerated,92 the in-
ability to obtain public benefits renders this task even more chal-
lenging. The societal costs of ex-offender default can be 
staggering: additional terms of incarceration that cost taxpayer 
money and possibly more crime committed by those desperate to 
make ends meet. 
A criminal record also can affect custody of one's children, even 
if the conviction occurred before someone became a parent. In 
Pennsylvania, theft crimes automatically render a parent ineligi-
ble for participation in a subsidized child-care program.93 Again, 
the indigent defendant who is also a parent now may have an ad-
ditional expense to carry alone, even if the crime that he or she 
was convicted for occurred prior to becoming a parent. Convic-
tions can also be a reason to justify divorce. 91 Most significantly, 
criminal histories are often part of the ''best interests of the child" 
analysis conducted by judges when determining custody rights.95 
Few would dispute that a parent's criminal history is relevant to 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a) (2012); see 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-167(b) (1995) (detailing 
the impact of a final criminal conviction in a drug related offense on eviction proceedings). 
89. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5329(a) (2014). I 
90. 43 PA. CODE§ 7.3(b)(6) (2015). 
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 25A(b)(2)(D) (2012). 
92. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728 (2010). 
93. 55 PA. CODE§ 3041.189(a)(l) (2015). 
94. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 330l(a)(5) (2010). 
95. King, supra note 11, at 30; 23 PA. CONS. STA'l'. ANN.§§ 2511(a)(9), 5329(a) (2014). 
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this calculation; however, it is likely that very few criminal de-
fendants realize that a conviction can affect this calculation for 
their entire life.96 
3. Citizenship Status and Political Participation 
The web of collateral consequences in most jurisdictions can 
lead to a permanent separation of ex-offenders from the commu-
nity regardless of the extent to which a defendant has been reha-
bilitated.97 Often referred to as "civil death," ex-offenders perma-
nently lose certain social and fundamental rights.98 
Specifically, misdemeanor convictions can disqualify one from 
the right to ever own a firearm99 or to enter the military. 100 Such 
convictions also can render one ineligible for student loan and 
grant assistance. 101 Felony convictions result in automatic depri-
vation of the right to vote in several jurisdictions. 102 The ability to 
serve on a jury or as a witness in a trial may also be restricted af-
ter a conviction. 103 Put simply, one's ability to live as a normal cit-
izen or resident may be severely hampered following a conviction. 
In Padilla, the Supreme Court gave one particular collateral 
consequence credibility: deportation. 101 With each additional legis-
96. King, supra note 11, at 30-31 (describing case in Pennsylvania involving ARD 
disposition that affected ability to retain custody). 
97. Id. at 32 ("As large numbers of particular groups are stigmatized and disempow-
ered through the reach of collateral consequences, whole communities are marginalized 
and excluded from participation in mainstream society."); see also Andrew E. Taslitz, De-
stroying the Village to Save it: The Warfare Analogy (or Dis-analogy?) and the Moral Im-
perative to Address Collateral Consequences, 54 How. L. J. 501, 511-12 (2011). 
98. See, e.g., Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death''.· The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disen-
franchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1046-49, 1059-64 (2002); 
see also Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional 
Frarneworh for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Rec-
ords, 7 J.L. Soc'Y 18, 18-21 (2005) (analyzing whether those with convictions may be a 
protected class due to the variety of barriers that come with a conviction). 
99. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012) (prohibiting firearm ownership for individual convict-
ed of misdemeanor domestic violence crime); see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6105 
(2014). 
100. See AM. BAH Ass'N, INTEHNAL EXILE: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION 
IN FEDERAL LAWS AND HEGULA.TIONS 18 (2009). 
101. See, e.g., 24 PA. CONS. STA'r. ANN. § 5158.2(a)(l) (2006). 
102. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 1301(a) (2014). 
103. See id. § 59112 (2013) (stating that a conviction can be shown for credibility pur-
poses). 
104. See generally Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
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lative reform, Congress has adopted stringent standards related 
to convictions resulting in broader exclusions for those convicted 
of certain offenses. 105 In contrast, from 1917 until 1990, "there was 
no such creature as an automatically deportable offense."106 Ra-
ther, sentencing judges exercised broad discretion to not deport 
by issuing judicial recommendations against deportation 
("JRAD"). 107 Congress, through a series of reforms in the 1990s, 
eliminated both this sentencing discretion and the Attorney Gen-
eral's discretion to block deportation. 108 
While rendering deportation automatic was a sea change, 
broadening the class of convictions that can result in that conse-
quence is another. Whereas serious, aggravated felonies and hei-
nous crimes of moral turpitude were not tolerated from the start, 
the list of offenses has grown. Crimes that do not carry a jail sen-
tence, such as minor controlled substance offenses, can lead to 
deportation. 109 As a result, the number of conviction-triggered de-
portations has skyrocketed. 110 Whether these measures are ap-
propriate as matters of public policy is beyond the scope of this 
article, but their existence has serious implications for due pro-
cess concerns for the unknowing criminal defendant who decides 
to plead guilty. 
1299, 1301 (2011) (noting how after Padilla, deportation is no longer a "purely civil" pro-
ceeding). 
105. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) ("While once there was only a 
narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to 
prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable 
offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of depor-
tation."). 
106. Id. at 362. 
107. Id. at 361-62. 
108. Id. at 363. 
109. Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a Sixth Amendment 
Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 585, 
586 (2011). 
110. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FY 2011: ICE ANNOUNCES 
YEAR-END REMOVAL NUMUERS, HIGHLIGHTS Focus ON KEY PRIORITIES INCLUDING 
THREATS TO PUilLIC SAFETY AND NATIONAL SECURITY (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http: 
//www.ice.gov/news/releases/fy-2011-ice-announces-year-end-removal-numbers-highlights-
focus-key-priorities. Nearly 36,000 noncitizens were deported for DUI convictions. Id. 
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C. Legal Literacy 
As John D. King notes, "[T]he collateral consequences of low-
level convictions often catch convicted misdemeanants by sur-
prise."111 They are also unapparent to players within the system,, 
such as prosecutors and defense attorneys, who are often over-
burdened with caseloads and working within a process-oriented 
adjudicatory system.112 And if counsel is not present because 
counsel is not required, no one within the system has the respon-
sibility to explain such consequences to the unknowing defend-
ant.113 That defendant will more often than not consider it ration-
al to take a plea offer with direct consequences that are tolerable 
at the time. As King relays, "Faced with the choice between leav-
ing court with a small fine and a conviction, and facing a trial 
weeks or months in the future with the possibility of six months 
of incarceration, most people would quickly take the non-jail al-
ternative and consider the matter closed."114 
But the scope of the literacy problem extends beyond the de-
fense. Aside from defense counsel and defendants, judges tend to 
know some information about collateral consequences, but not 
much. 115 A nationwide survey conducted in the last decade sug-
gests that while discussion of collateral consequences does appear 
in state courtrooms, it happens inconsistently and unevenly. 116 In 
fact, over 70% of judges who participated in the study stated that 
they mention collateral consequences "sometimes" with 38% per-
cent stating that they "rarely" or "never" mention them. 117 In the 
111. King, supra note 11, at 24. 
112. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS Is THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN 
A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 272-74 (1979). 
113. See King, supra note 11, at 4. 
114. Id. at 3-4. The fact that this type of decision is made by defendants without the 
assistance of counsel is why many have called for expansion of the right to counsel. See 
infra Part III. 
115. See generally Alec C. Ewald & Marnie Smith, Collateral Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions in American Courts: The View from the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 145, 152-
56 (2008) (discussing the results of a survey of state judges). 
116. Id. at 148, 152 ("Most judges report that some party-prosecutor, defense attor· 
ney, defendant-raises the issue of collateral consequences at least occasionally in their 
courtroom."). 
117. Id. at 153. Again, the authors interpret the data to show that roughly 60% of judg-
es mention collateral consequences "sometimes" or more. Id. While that may indicate that 
someone is mentioning consequences, we still do not know what judges are actually men-
tioning. Specifically, we do not know whether judges are mentioning specific consequences 
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same survey, 57% of judges admitted that such consequences in-
hibit reentry. 118 As for prosecutors, the study found that 51% of 
judges stated that prosecutors rarely or never discuss collateral 
consequences in the judge's courtroom. 119 
In fairness, this study only covers discussion of collateral con-
sequences generally and in the courtroom. But the fact that the 
data does not provide more conclusive evidence of knowledge of 
specific collateral consequences amplifies how this is a systemic 
literacy issue. Periodic, generic discussions are indeed one aspect 
of the literacy problem; however, the content and depth of those 
discussions, when and where they happen, and between whom, is 
really the type of evidence that is necessary to determine the 
depth of illiteracy. While the authors in the study concluded that 
awareness of collateral consequences is more visible than many 
assume, 120 the study does not offer insight into the depth of that 
awareness. And if the players within the system only discuss con-
sequences less than half of the time, one can only surmise how in-
formed and specific the discussion is when it happens. 
Hence, notice of collateral consequences may be framed as a 
systemic literacy issue. Unawareness of collateral consequences 
indirectly supports a criminal system processing countless cases 
without regard to their broader effect on individuals and commu-
nities. In this regard, any response to the problem must be sys-
temic and heighten legal literacy long-term. 
II. THE LAW OF GUILTY PLEAS AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
Because guilty pleas are the primary means by which convic-
tions occur within the criminal system, 121 the legal standards for 
determining whether a plea is valid are relevant to increasing 
or the idea of collateral consequences generally. 
118. Id. at 154. 
119. Id. at 153. 
120. Id. at 161. 
121. See SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., 
NCJ 226846, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006-STATISTICAL TABLES 1, 25 tbl. 
4.1 (2009) (showing that 94% of felony convictions in state courts in 2006 were the result 
of guilty pleas); UNIV. AT ALBANY, SOURCEllOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STA'l'ISTICS tbl. 
5.22.2009, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf (indicating 
that 83, 707 out of 86,314 criminal convictions in federal courts in 2009 were the result of 
guilty or no contest pleas). 
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awareness of collateral consequences. This section analyzes 
whether current doctrine surrounding the validity of pleas con-
tains room for notice of the ever-expanding number of collateral 
consequences. 
A. Basic Guilty Plea Standards 
The seminal case on the validity of guilty pleas is Brady v. 
United States. 122 Under Brady, pleas must be voluntary, knowing, 
and intelligent. 123 Voluntariness is primarily a question of wheth-
er coercion-directly or indirectly-is the source of the plea. 124 The 
knowing and intelligent aspects of a plea, pursuant to Brady, 
hinge on "sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and 
likely consequences."120 Pleas that are not voluntary, knowing, 
and intelligent implicate the Due Process Clauses of the Consti-
tution and may be negated by reviewing courts. 126 
In Boykin v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that pleas must 
be entered in front of a judge. 121 The trial judge is tasked with de-
termining the validity of the plea. As long as the record indicates 
that the trial court advised the defendant of the rights being 
waived and asked whether the defendant intends to plead guilty, 
it is likely that a plea will stand. 128 The guilty plea colloquy is also 
sufficient for proof of a valid plea. 129 Nevertheless, Boykin and its 
progeny stand for the proposition that the courts are institutional 
safeguards of the validity of pleas. 
Many have tested the meaning of the "knowing" and "intelli-
gent" aspects of pleas. Knowledge of one's rights is one aspect of 
the analysis; another is awareness of the consequences of a plea. 
As this article has demonstrated, a conviction comes with certain 
direct and indirect consequences. But is awareness of collateral 
122. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
123. Id. at 748. 
124. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 632-33 (1998); see also, e.g., Velez v. New 
York, 941 F. Supp. 300, 312 (E.D. N.Y. 1996). 
125. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. 
126. See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942). 
127. 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969). 
128. See, e.g., Hill v. Beyer, 62 F.3d 474, 476, 478, 480, 481, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). 
129. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 532 N.W.2d 111, 114, 119 (Wis. 1995). 
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consequences necessary for a plea to be "knowing" and "intelli-
gent"? 
B. Current Jurisprudence on Guilty Pleas and Collateral 
Consequences 
Under current constitutional law, advice about collateral con-
sequences, from the court or counsel, is generally unnecessary fot 
a plea to be valid. This rule stems from Brady, which considers 
pleas to be legitimate if "one [is] fully aware of the direct conse-
quences, including the actual value of any commitments made to 
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel."130 Several lower 
courts have used this language to deny claims that unawareness 
of serious collateral consequences should negate a plea. 131 This 
remains common despite the fact that the reference to direct con-
sequences followed the Court's explication of the voluntariness 
inquiry, a fact often ignored by courts interpreting the holding of 
Brady. 1a2 Yet, despite being dicta, the Court's statements have led 
to the development of an entire body of case law dividing collat-
eral and direct consequences. As a result, most courts do not re-
quire advice to the defendant, by the court, about anything but 
direct consequences. 133 This rule holds despite the difficulty in de-
ciphering the difference between an automatic collateral conse-
quence and a direct consequence that is not incarceration, such as 
a fine. 131 Despite no constitutional requirement of notice in this 
area, more than half of the states have adopted statutes or rules 
that require courts to notify defendants of deportation conse-
135 quences. 
130. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (emphasis added) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 
F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en bane), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). 
131. See, e.g., United States v. Muhammad, 747 F.3d 1234, 1239-41 (10th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2741 (2014). 
182. Roberts, supra note 22, at 686. 
183. See, e.g., Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425, 438 (D. Mass. 1996) ("[E]ntering the 
guilty plea without knowledge of the potential for registration and community notification 
does not render his plea involuntary and, thus, does not violate the Constitution."); Meyers 
v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147, 1153 (3d Cir. 1996) (parole eligibility); Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 
781, 782 (5th Cir. 1975) (suspension of driver's license); Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 
379, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1964) (loss of right to vote). 
134. Roberts, supra note 22, at 679-80. 
135. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 382 (2010). 
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Advocates for expanding constitutional doctrine to include col-
lateral consequences received a small boost with the Supreme 
Court's recent decisions in Frye and Padilla. Prior to Padilla, ad-
vice about collateral consequences from an attorney was unneces-
sary for effective assistance of counsel in all contexts. 136 Padilla's 
holding changed the rule for deportation and its logic arguably 
could be applied to other indirect consequences. 137 Frye also was 
decided in the context of effectiveness of counsel at the time of 
plea-bargaining. 138 Again, while they do not directly implicate the 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent standard of Brady and its 
progeny, both cases suggest the importance of awareness of col-
lateral consequences in the criminal system. But the effect of 
those decisions is arguably minimal because they occurred in the 
Sixth Amendment context and the standards mentioned above re-
fer to notice from courts under the Fifth Amendment. 139 
1. Padilla v. Kentucky 
Padilla gave credibility to the idea that collateral consequences 
are relevant to determining the legitimacy of a criminal adjudica-
tion, albeit in the effectiveness of counsel context. This distinction 
is critical: the fact that Padilla is an ineffectiveness case under 
the Sixth Amendment severely limits its applicability to unknow-
ing pleas because litigation post-Padilla would only come in the 
form of a collateral attack, which could result in a worse outcome 
for a defendant. 1 w 
136. Id. at 376 (Alita, J., concurring) (citing Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., 
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 COHNELL L. REV. 
697, 699 (2002) (noting that more than thirty states and eleven federal circuits did not 
mandate advice about collateral consequences)). 
137. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 376. 
138. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S._,_, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012). 
139. Frye and Padilla are ineffective assistance of counsel cases, which is a separate 
issue from whether a plea is knowing and intelligent. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359; Frye, 566 
U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1404. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, both cases recog-
nize the significance of notice of collateral consequences, and by definition, comprehend 
awareness of collateral consequences as a matter of legal literacy. As discussed infra Part 
IV, this premise should spur legislative and administrative reform to heighten notice 
through institutional actors in addition to counsel, especially given the litigation difficul-
ties that come with ineffectiveness claims. See infra Part III.B.l (discussing the shortcom-
ings of leaning on expansion of the right to counsel as the primary solution). 
140. Because the plea offer could be taken away if the defendant were to succeed on the 
habeas ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372-73. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to understand the spirit of Padilla 
when determining how to craft an adequate solution to the prob-
lems identified above. In Padilla, the defendant pled guilty to a 
drug-trafficking charge after counsel failed to advise him of pos-
sible deportation as a result of the conviction and affirmatively 
stated that he did not have to worry given his long-term residence 
in the country. 141 Unfortunately for Padilla, the drug conviction 
made his deportation virtually mandatory. 142 
Justice Stevens, author of the majority opinion, emphasized the 
unique nature of deportation. 143 While conceding that deportation 
was a civil sanction, Justice Stevens refused to draw a clear line 
between direct and collateral consequences within the Sixth 
Amendment context. 144 Deportation, as a "severe" penalty that 
was "intimately related to the criminal process," is arguably in a 
class of its own. 145 Notably, Justice Stevens suggested that the 
"automatic" nature of the penalty contributed to its uniqueness. 146 
These aspects of deportation, coupled with its increased incidence 
due to broader statutes and diminished executive discretion, "con-
firm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an 
integral part-indeed, sometimes the most important part-of the 
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead 
guilty to specified crimes."147 
The majority proceeded to explain what is required of counsel 
in a similar situation, ultimately concluding that professional 
norms dictate that defense counsel advise a defendant that depor-
tation is likely when the statute is clear in defining the conse-
quences of the conviction.us If the law is unclear, the duty is only 
to advise of possible immigration consequences as a result of the 
plea. 149 Notably, this rule seems to place a significant burden on 
141. Id. at 359. 
142. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012). 
143. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 357. 
144. See id. at 365-66. 
145. Id. at 365. 
146. See id. at 366. 
147. Id. at 363-64. 
148. Id. at 368-69. 
149. Id. at 369. 
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counsel who may not possess the requisite expertise in immigra-
tion law necessary to decipher which situation is applicable to a 
particular defendant. 150 
Justice Alito's concurring opinion suggested a slightly modified 
constitutional rule. For Justice Alito, the Sixth Amendment only 
requires an attorney to refrain from providing incorrect advice or 
to warn of possible adverse consequences without offering specific 
recommendations. 151 Justice Alito's rationale for this lower stand-
ard for counsel is that the complexity and breadth of collateral 
consequences, even beyond the immigration context, weigh 
against placing additional demands on counsel: 
Criminal defense attorneys have expertise regarding the conduct of 
criminal proceedings. They are not expected to possess-and very of-
ten do not possess--expertise in other areas of the law, and it is un-
realistic to expect them to provide expert advice on matters that lie 
'd h . ft . . d . 152 outs1 e t e1r area o rammg an experience. 
Justice Alito enumerated several other collateral consequences 
that could be labeled "serious," such as loss of voting rights and 
difficulty finding employment. 153 The logic of the majority opinion 
could be extended to those consequences as well, which could 
overwhelm counsel. Justice Alito, despite proposing his modified 
constitutional rule, seems to long for non-constitutional remedies 
in the form of statutes and court rules. 154 Such prophylactic 
measures would relieve the burden placed on counsel by a consti-
tutional rule and exist outside of the Sixth Amendment context, 
thereby mitigating the need for future litigation. 155 
150. For a discussion of this issue beyond the immigration context, see infra Part 
III.B.1. 
151. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375 (Alito, J., concurring). 
152. Id. at 376. 
153. Id. It is important to keep in mind that "serious" is a relative term in this context. 
A defendant's particular situation will often determine the ability to accept collateral con-
sequences that might be insignificant to another individual. 
154. Id. at 382. The majority's rule inadvertently stifles "more promising ways of ad-
dressing the underlying problem-such as statutory or administrative reforms requiring 
trial judges to inform a defendant on the record that a guilty plea may carry adverse im-
migration consequences." Id. At the time of Padilla, twenty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia had already adopted rules, plea forms, or statutes requiring courts to advise 
criminal defendants of possible immigration consequences. Id. 
155. Id. at 387. 
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2. Missouri v. Frye 
In Frye, the Court held that the right to effective assistance of 
counsel extends to the plea-bargaining process156 and that counsel 
is required to convey offers to a defendant. 157 Frye, charged with 
driving with a revoked license for the fourth time, never received 
two plea offers conveyed to his counsel. 158 He ultimately submit-
ted an open guilty that resulted in three years of incarceration. 15n 
Upon learning that his counsel had received an offer that would 
have resulted in only ninety days of incarceration, he filed a peti-
tion for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 160 
Frye, like Padilla, arises in the ineffectiveness of counsel con-
text and therefore deals primarily with Sixth Amendment stand-
ards rather than the validity of guilty pleas or the legitimacy of 
collateral consequences. 161 It also contains significant limitations 
given the demands of Strickland v. Washington for habeas re-
lief.162 But it reinforces and lends credibility to the notion that le-
gal standards-constitutional or not-should be cognizant of the 
reality that guilty pleas dominate the criminal system. 163 
156. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. _, _ 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012) (holding that the 
right applies to "all 'critical' stages of the criminal proceedings" including plea bargaining); 
see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972) (finding that the guilty plea is a 
critical stage). 
157. Frye, 566 U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1408. 
158. Id. at 1404. 
159. Id. at 1404-05. 
160. Id. at 1404. 
161. See id. at 1404, 1406 (explaining that the challenge was not to advice pertaining to 
the accepted guilty plea, but rather other aspects of the representation); Padilla v. Ken-
tucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment controls regardless 
of whether deportation is or is not a collateral consequence). 
162. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring the defendant to prove that counsel's perfor-
mance was deficient and the deficient performance prejudiced the defense). 
163. Frye, 566 U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 ("The State's contentions are neither illogi-
cal nor without some persuasive force, yet they do not suffice to overcome a simple reality. 
Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are 
the result of guilty pleas .... The reality is that plea bargains have become so central to 
the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have responsibili-
ties in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate 
assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical 
stages."). The Court proceeded to cite Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargain-
ing as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1912 (1992) ("That is what plea bargaining is. It is 
not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system."). Id. 
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The primary issue in Frye was whether counsel might be defi-
cient for not conveying the terms of a plea offer to a defendant, 
especially if those terms are favorable. 164 The Court answered in 
the affirmative because the plea-bargaining realities of the crimi-
nal system make an informed plea, with the aid of counsel, essen-
tial to the legitimacy of the process. 165 As Justice Kennedy con-
cluded, "In today's criminal justice system, therefore, the 
negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, 
is almost always the critical point for a defendant."166 
Thus, Frye reinforces the significance of notice and how its ab-
sence can lead to a viable habeas claim under the Sixth Amend-
ment. In this sense, it follows the theme of notice running 
through Padilla. Both cases suggest that effectiveness of counsel 
and the legitimacy of pleas hinge on how well-informed a defend-
ant is, by counsel, when making a decision about whether to 
plead guilty. 167 Hence, both decisions constitutionalized notice. rns 
In Padilla, notice was linked to collateral consequences, albeit on-
ly with respect to immigration. 169 In Frye, notice is linked to the 
plea bargaining process itself. 110 Because both cases concede the 
heightened significance of the guilty plea to the administration of 
the criminal system and involve effectiveness of counsel claims, 
commentators and scholars have called for an expansion of the 
164. Frye, 566 U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1404. 
165. Id. at 1407-08. 
166. Id. at 1407 (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy also states: "[C]riminal defendants 
require effective counsel during plea negotiations. 'Anything less ... might deny a defend-
ant effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would 
help him."' Id. at 1407-08 (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964)). 
As Stephanos Bibas notes, Padilla marked the first time that the Court began to regulate 
plea bargaining as the main aspect of the criminal justice process instead of the right to a 
jury trial. See Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1118-19. 
167. See Frye, 566 U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 ("[A]s a general rule, defense counsel 
has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms 
and conditions that may be favorable to the accused."); Bibas, Regulating the Plea-
Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1120 ("With Padilla, the Court has now begun to 
interpret due process and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to impose meaningful 
safeguards on the plea process."). 
168. See Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1118 (noting 
how Padilla "marks a watershed in the Court's approach to regulating plea bargains"). 
Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Frye, suggests the same idea, when criticizing the Court's 
methodology: "[I]t does present the necessity of confronting the serious difficulties that 
will be created by constitutionalization of the plea-bargaining process." Frye, 566 U.S. at 
_, 132 S. Ct. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
169. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359-60 (2010). 
170. See Frye, 566 U.S. at_, 132 S. Ct. at 1404. 
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right to counsel to ensure legitimate pleas, regulate the plea. 
bargaining market, and alleviate unforeseen collateral conse. 
quences. 171 Part III evaluates these claims to determine whether 
expansion of the right to counsel, alone, is sufficient to alleviate 
the effect of collateral consequences on the pleading defendant. 
III. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AS A SOLU'rION 
A criminal justice system dominated by the twin realities of 
guilty pleas and increasing collateral consequences has led to 
ample calls for expansion of the right to counsel. 112 Some have 
called for an expansion of current constitutional doctrine, where-
as others have focused their efforts on legislative action. 173 The 
assumption underlying these efforts is that counsel is the silver 
bullet necessary to alleviate the significant effects of such conse-
quences.174 Counsel, it is said, will not only increase the likelihood 
that a defendant knows the indirect ramifications of taking a plea 
deal, but will possibly manage to obtain a better plea deal alto-
gether.175 
In order to evaluate the merits of this position, this section will 
begin with a discussion of current doctrine regarding the right to 
counsel. After discussing the federal standard as well as a few no-
table state standards that go beyond the federal minimum, this 
section will evaluate the likelihood that the right can be expand-
ed, either doctrinally or statutorily. Additionally, it will analyze 
the claim that expansion of the right to counsel, alone, will miti-
gate the effect of collateral consequences, especially in a post-
Padilla world. 
171. See, e.g., King, supra note 11, at 47. 
172. See generally id. at 2-3, 22 (noting that because 70% of misdemeanor defendants 
plea guilty and the collateral consequences of a misdemeanor conviction have increased, 
the right to effective assistance of counsel should be extended to those defendants as well). 
173. See id. at 342 (arguing for an expansion of the constitutional doctrine); Bibas, 
Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 33, at 1120 (stating that legislation is 
necessary). 
174. See generally Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 
1120, 1158 (contending that, even with the necessity of legislation to regulate the plea 
bargain process under a model of consumer protection law, the advice of counsel remains 
of vital importance). 
175. See King, supra note 11, at 24, 34, 44-45. 
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A. The Scope of the Current Right to Counsel 
The right to the assistance of counsel finds its ongm in the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which states 
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right ... to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his defence."176 
There is support to the idea that the original intention of the 
Sixth Amendment was to afford the right to retain counsel at 
one's own expense. 177 Notably, the guarantee was broader than 
the English common law, which actually disallowed the assis-
tance of a lawyer for serious crimes. 178 
1. Federal Constitutional Standards 
The current rules regarding the right to counsel under the 
Federal Constitution stem from Scott v. Illinois, which generally 
held that the right to counsel extends to defendants charged with 
offenses that result in actual incarceration.179 Decades prior to 
Scott, the Court began explicating the content of the right to 
counsel in Powell v. Alabama.180 In Powell, nine African American 
men charged with rape, a capital offense at the time, were not 
appointed counsel; all were convicted at trials that occurred in 
one day. 181 The Court held that due process required the presence 
of counsel in state capital cases because the absence of counsel 
left the unrepresented defendant helpless in the hyper-technical 
field oflaw. 182 
176. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
177. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979) ("There is considerable doubt 
that the Sixth Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of the Bill of Rights, 
contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution 
in a federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense."); Alfredo Garcia, The Right 
to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 41-
42 (1991). 
178. JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 4 (2002) ("The 
assistance of counsel was seen as an impediment to efficient and successful prosecution 
and punishment."). 
179. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373. 
180. 287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932). 
181. Id. at 45-46, 49-50. 
182. Id. at 68-69, 71 ("The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it 
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated 
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law .... He requires the guiding 
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not 
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A few years later, the Court opted for a bright-line rule in the 
federal context, holding that the federal government had to pro-
vide counsel to any defendant facing criminal charges. 183 It took 
three decades for this right to extend to state criminal proceed-
ings beyond the guarantees in Powell. Of course, that occurred in 
the seminal case of Gideon v. Wainwright, which established the 
right to government-provided counsel in any serious case. 184 The 
doctrine rested on the idea of reciprocal fairness: a fair trial, giv-
en the "vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defend-
ants accused of crime," required the presence of counsel. 185 The 
court maintained that the right to counsel was "fundamental and 
essential to a fair trial."186 Despite this strong language in Gideon, 
the contours of the right remained unknown until a decade lat-
1s1 er. 
The Court extended the right to counsel to misdemeanor prose-
cutions involving actual incarceration in Argersinger v. Hamlin. 188 
For the Court, extension of the right to counsel to such criminal 
prosecutions placed the protection on the same plane as the rest 
of the Sixth Amendment guarantees, which departed from Eng-
lish common law in their breadth. 189 For the Court, ensuring a fair 
trial through the presence of counsel was just as important in so-
called petty cases, stating that "[w]e are by no means convinced 
that legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that ac-
tually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period are any less 
complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or 
more."rno Interestingly, Justice Powell foresaw many of the co~­
ceptual difficulties confronting the narrow rules outlined by the 
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his in-
nocence."). 
183. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) ("The Sixth Amendment withholds 
from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an ac-
cused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel."). 
184. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("[R)eason and reflection require us to recognize that in 
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to 
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."). Notably, 
Gideon involved a felony charge, a trend continued in the cases to follow. Id. at 336-37. 
185. Id. at 344. 
186. Id. at 342 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1992)). 
187. See King, supra note 11, at 11 (describing how states adapted differently to the 
Gideon decision). 
188. See 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
189. See id. at 27-30. 
190. Id. at 33. 
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Court in the right to counsel cases. mi Justice Powell favored a 
more flexible approach that was cognizant of a variety of conse-
quences beyond incarceration. 192 Indeed, Justice Powell suggested 
the importance of collateral consequences: "The consequences of a 
misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief period served 
under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or 
the effect of a criminal record on employability, are frequently of 
sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label 
'petty."'1n:i 
Despite Justice Powell's alternative approach, the Court reaf-
firmed the Argersinger holding in Scott, which involved a misde-
meanor theft prosecution that resulted in a $50 fine for the de-
fendant and no period of incarceration. 194 Justice Rehnquist, who 
had concurred with Justice Powell in Argersinger, wrote the ma-
jority opinion. 195 For the Court, counsel only needed to be appoint-
ed in cases that resulted in actual incarceration because the loss 
of liberty was an especially unique consequence. 196 Notably, Jus-
tice Rehnquist chose not to mention collateral consequences in his 
opinion despite his earlier concurrence with Justice Powell in Ar-
gersinger.l!n Nevertheless, "the decision in Scott essentially froze 
the evolution of the right to appointed counsel."198 
From a doctrinal perspective, the right to counsel jurispru-
dence contains serious deficiencies. As Justice Brennan noted in 
his dissent, it is quite odd to ask judges to decide in advance of 
191. See King, supra note 11, at 13 (noting how Justice Powell's opinion "is prescient 
for its focus on the potential impact of the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction 
and for its argument that courts should account for these consequences in evaluating 'seri· 
ousness' in the context of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel"). 
192. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 447-48 (Powell, J., concurring). 
193. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 48 n.11 (noting collateral consequences such 
as stigma, loss of a driver's license, loss of public office, disqualification from a profession, 
and loss of pension rights). 
194. Scott v. Illinois, 4,10 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). 
195. Id. at 367; see also Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 44. 
196. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74. Justice Powell concurred, albeit reluctantly, and em-
phasized the flexible approach that he called for in Argersinger. See id. at 374 (Powell, J., 
concurring). Justice Brennan authored a vehement dissent that labeled the majority opin-
ion as inconsistent with precedent and perversely incentivizing the judicial system to play 
legislature. See id. at 375-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
197. See id. at 373. ("[W]e believe that the central premise of Argersinger-that actual 
imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprison-
ment-is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line de-
fining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel."). 
198. King, supra note 11, at 15. 
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trial whether incarceration will be the penalty. 199 Further, draw-
ing a line at incarceration appears arbitrary given the text of the 
Sixth Amendment, which refers to "all criminal prosecutions."200 
It is arguably more difficult to apply than drawing the line at the 
threat of incarceration, which is governed by legislative decision-
making. The Court also dismisses the significance of fairness in 
lower-level cases despite the fact that the actual prosecution of 
such a case can be nearly the same procedurally. 201 But most sig-
nificantly for the collateral consequences issue, the jurisprudence 
fails to account for the myriad effects that a petty offense convic-
tion can have on an unrepresented defendant. The increased ef-
fect of collateral consequences since Scott has magnified this 
oversight. 202 
2. Right to "Effective" Counsel 
Although the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment is defined by the imposition of actual incarceration 
and thereby only exists for a subset of criminal defendants, the 
right more broadly contains the guarantee of "effective" counsel.203 
In other words, an attorney must adequately prepare the case, 
whether for trial, in plea negotiations, 201 or some other aspect. 
The Court's holding in Strickland governs whether counsel 
may be considered effective or not. Strickland, by its facts, in-
volved counsel's actions at trial and in capital sentencing proceed-
199. Scott, 440 U.S. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also King, supra note 11, at 15 
("Like the Queen of Hearts in Alice in Wonderland, judges in low-level cases are invited to 
decide in some respect the sentence before the trial."). 
200. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
201. See King, supra note 11, at 15-16 ("With rare exception, the rules of evidence and 
procedure are the same, and the complexity of trials is not necessarily different."). 
202. See id. at 17 (describing how the "era of greatly expanded collateral consequences" 
followed Scott, which was precisely the worst time given how right to counsel jurispru-
dence was frozen). 
203. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
204. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985); Bibas, Regulating the Plea-
Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1126 ("The Court put great faith in competent de-
fense counsel as the only substantial safeguard. As long as lawyers offered competent ad-
vice, even if they turned out to be wrong in hindsight, defendants supposedly could fore-
cast whether pleas served their self-interests. That romanticized vision, however, ignored 
the workloads, underfunding, and agency costs that beset defense lawyers and the difficul-
ties of proving incompetence on undeveloped plea records."). 
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ings. 20" The Court announced two components to the test for effec-
tiveness: poor attorney performance and prejudice to the defend-
ant as a result of the attorney's actions. 206 The first prong, wheth-
er an attorney acted deficiently or not, is guided by objective 
standards of reasonableness.207 Despite its objective component, 
courts are required to be deferential to counsel's actions.208 The 
second aspect of the test is also difficult to demonstrate. The de-
fendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceed-
ing would have been different. A reasonable probability is a prob-
ability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."209 In 
the plea context, that means the defendant must show that he 
would not have plead guilty but for attorney incompetence.210 
Post-Frye, it also can mean that an attorney was ineffective for 
failing to convey a good offer or provide proper advice related to 
the offer. 211 
Because the Sixth Amendment requires "effective" counsel, ex-
pansion of the right to counsel necessarily would result in incor-
poration of all "effectiveness" jurisprudence into the everyday 
practice of defense counsel. As explained above, in a post-Padilla 
world, "effectiveness" can possibly include collateral consequenc-
es.212 Thus, expansion of the right to counsel would not operate in 
a vacuum. It may be a prophylactic measure designed to combat 
pleas that are not cognizant of collateral consequences. But with 
all of the "effectiveness" jurisprudence coming along as well, is 
this prophylactic solution the most appropriate way to address 
the issue? Any evaluation of the possible effect of expansion of the 
205. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 675 (1984). 
206. Id. at 687. 
207. Id. at 687-88. 
208. See id. at 689. As long as an attorney stays somewhat close to professionally re-
sponsible conduct, a court is likely to find that the performance was not deficient. See id. 
at 689-91. 
209. Id. at 694. 
210. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
211. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S._, _, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (holding that 
the right applies to "all 'critical stages" of the criminal proceedings, which includes plea 
bargaining); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. _, _, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385, (2012) (dis-
cussing the Strichland "prejudice" standard as it applies to plea offer rejections). 
212. See supra Part II.B.1. The astute reader will recall that Padilla did not decide the 
question of prejudice for the defendant and, in fact, left it to lower courts to decipher what 
that actually means in practice in the immigration context. 
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procedural right to counsel must be cognizant of the requirements 
of "effectiveness" as a substantive aspect of the right. 
B. Shortcomings as Solution 
1. Litigating Habeas Claims Based on Effectiveness: A Tough 
Standard to Meet 
Padilla was largely considered a victory for criminal defend-
ants.213 But does it really address the underlying issue of collat-
eral consequences literacy? This section examines whether Pa-
dilla, by broadening the responsibilities of counsel, will heighten 
awareness of collateral consequences if it is extended beyond the 
immigration context. 
The first consequence of Padilla is that it arguably confined 
collateral consequence jurisprudence to the effectiveness of coun-
sel arena. While Padilla rightfully imposed an additional respon-
sibility on counsel representing a defendant possibly facing de-
portation, it also laid the groundwork for a piecemeal approach to 
notice of other collateral consequences through counsel. In other 
words, because notice of collateral consequences was recognized 
as an aspect of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which in 
turn is litigated through effectiveness claims, expansion of such 
notice will likely have to occur within the same constitutional 
context. As a practical matter, even if counsel were to be required 
to go beyond Padilla, it would take years to determine, piecemeal, 
how far counsel must go. And assuming that most cases will not 
reach the Supreme Court, clarity will remain most likely nothing 
but a desired outcome of the defense bar. That sort of timetable 
fails to account for the pressing problem that collateral conse-
quences may impose on defendants currently deciding whether to 
plead guilty. If notice of collateral consequences poses as large a 
problem as many have indicated, then should the legal system be 
content to attack the problem through the hyper-technical effec-
tiveness of counsel jurisprudence? 
This might be labeled as a pace problem for the development of 
doctrine. The problem is even more apparent when one considers 
213. See King, supra note 11, at 37 (conferring a right to effective assistance of coun-
sel). 
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the difficulty of establishing a viable ineffectiveness of counsel 
claim once a defendant chooses to bring it. The majority in Pa-
dilla conceded that the test for ineffectiveness in Strickland and 
its progeny is a difficult standard to meet. 214 The Court also did 
not decide the question of prejudice in Padilla, instead opting to 
remand the case to the lower court, thereby leaving an aspect of 
the law undeveloped. 215 As noted above, the first prong of Strick-
land is highly deferential to professional norms and the actions of 
defense counsel; the second component requires clear causation 
between the actions of defense counsel and the defendant's deci-
sion to plead guilty. 216 In fairness, lower courts have extended Pa-
dilla to a few consequences that were formerly considered by 
courts to be entirely collateral, such as sex offender registration,217 
and estoppel in a civil suit. 218 But this expansion of the duties of 
counsel has not necessarily resulted in viable ineffectiveness 
claims; defendants are still losing those fights. 219 In fact, some 
courts have allowed guilty plea warnings to mitigate the preju-
dice necessary to a successful Strichland claim.220 
Thus, using effectiveness of counsel jurisprudence to heighten 
notice of collateral consequences poses two problems. First, it is 
an incremental solution, at best, and leaves the addition of signif-
icant collateral consequences to the inchworm pace of litigating 
habeas claims. Second, even if the reasoning of Padilla were ex-
tended to other consequences, the deferential Strichland standard 
does not guarantee, by any stretch of the imagination, that notice 
will actually increase. Strichland can insulate defense counsel 
from changing best practices. Padilla itself conceded this point 
214. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). 
215. See id. at 374-75. 
216. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-59 (1985). 
217. See, e.g., In re C.P.H., No. FJ-03-1313-02, 2010 WL 2926541, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div .• July 23, 2010) (finding ineffective assistance when attorney failed to advise ju-
venile about lifetime registration); see also State v. Edwards, 157 P.3d 56, 64-65 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2007) (finding ineffectiveness when attorney failed to advise about sex offender regis-
tration). Edwards occurred pre-Padilla. Other courts have found the opposite. See State v. 
Emblad, Al0-444, 2011 WL 9148 at *3, *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2011). 
218. Wilson v. State, 244 P.3d 535, 536, 539 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (noting ineffective-
ness when attorney failed to advise how guilty plea would affect civil liability). 
219. See Danielle M. Lang, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect of Plea Colloquy Warnings 
on Defendants' Ability to Bring Successful Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L. J. 944, 975-84 
(2012) (noting how in the majority of cases within her study, courts found the plea colloquy 
to be significant when refusing to find prejudice). 
220. See id. at 979. 
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and advocates for increased, system-wide notice of collateral con-
sequences in response to the Court's warning. 
2. Complexity of Collateral Consequences and the Practical 
Demands of Padilla 
The more obvious problem with relying on the expansion of the 
right to counsel post-Padilla can be characterized as one of vol-
ume: how will attorneys possibly know all of the consequences 
relevant to the defendant before them? As Margaret Love has 
stated, "Padilla recognizes the need to make participants in a 
criminal case aware of non-criminal 'collateral' penalties that are 
frequently a crime's most serious punishment."221 With that, an 
immense education awaits defense counsel who wish to remain 
effective, and this would only expand exponentially with new ad-
ditions to the doctrine. 222 The permutations in the immigration 
field resulting from pleas to different criminal charges are al-
ready complicated.223 And knowledge of those complexities only 
comes with time and significant resource expenditures.224 
In short, "the brunt of the burden ... falls on defense coun-
sel."220 It may be more appropriate to say that the entire burden 
falls on defense counsel. And that burden is heavy indeed. Coun-
sel would be essentially tasked with determining all of the conse-
quences relevant to a particular situation.226 Comprehensive ad-
221. Margaret C. Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From Pun-
ishment to Regulation, 31 ST. Lours U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 89-90 (2011). 
222. Maureen A. Sweeney, Where Do We Go from Padilla v. Kentucky? Thoughts on 
Implementation and Future Directions, 45 New ENG. L. REV. 353, 357 (2011) ("There is a 
very large educational task ahead as a result of Padilla."). 
223. Id. at 358-59 (describing several examples of how different charges would dramat-
ically alter immigration consequences). 
224. Id. at 361 ("The implications of the decision are nonetheless clear: immigration-
related advice is required; that advice is complex and will require significant resources be 
devoted to it; and those resources must be devoted."). Some public defender associations 
have taken to hiring immigration attorneys or assigning current attorneys to become ex-
perts in the field of immigration consequences. The more likely result is that under-
resourced legal aid organizations will attempt to coordinate with defense counsel, which 
presents its own challenges. Id. at 361-62. 
225. Id. at 361. 
226. See generally Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Col-
lateral Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FOHDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1067, 1067 (2004). 
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vice would require research beyond the traditional capability of 
an individual attorney. 221 
However, many public defenders are already overburdened due 
to the sheer volume of cases requiring attention. Maximum case-
load standards are rare for indigent defense attorneys. 228 This 
high volume can lead to very serious consequences, like the un-
necessary deprivation of a defendant's liberty due to the sheer in-
ability of an attorney to research a minimum sentence or convey 
an offer to a defendant. 229 It also can drive a wedge between the 
interests of a defendant and defense counsel. 230 Public defenders' 
practices are often in triage mode. In an era of overburdened de-
fense counsel, is it possible that additional responsibilities would 
actually render it more difficult to notify defendants of the conse-
quences of their pleas?231 When conceptualized as a systemic is-
sue, attempting to increase notice solely through counsel is ques-
tionable at best. 
The National Institute of Justice's attempt to catalogue collat-
eral consequences by jurisdiction is one response to this prob-
lem. 232 Spearheaded by the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA, 
the project attempts to build an "inventory of any provision in the 
state constitution, statutes, and administrative rules that create 
collateral sanctions and authorize disqualifications with citations 
227. See Gabriel J. Chin, Mahing Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral 
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 How. L.J. 675, 685 (2011) [hereinafter Chin, Malling Pa-
dilla Practical]. 
228. THE CONST. PROJECT, NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: 
AMEIUCA'S CONTINUING NEGLEC'l' OF OUR CONSTI'l'UTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 67 (Apr. 
2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED]. 
229. Id. at 68-69. 
230. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L. J. 
1179, 1180 (1975) (examining the core assumption that the presence of defense counsel 
adds legitimacy to pleas and concluding that the "current conceptions of the defense attor-
ney's role are often more romanticized than real"). Alschuler's seminal article on the prac-
tices of overburdened defense attorneys shed light on how defense counsel, while often 
helpful in the administration of justice, also can be complicit in the unjust aspects of a 
plea-bargaining market. He describes how too often it is the case that defense counsel 
plays the role of the professional pleader in a system that provides opportunities for dis-
honest lawyers. See id. at 1185-98. 
231. Derek Wikstrom, "No Logical Stopping Point": The Consequences of Padilla v. 
Kentucky's Inevitable Expansion, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 351, 354-55 (2012) ("If Padilla warn-
ings are ultimately required for all collateral consequences of a guilty plea, criminal law-
yers will have a difficult time effectively assisting any of their clients."). 
232. See ABA, NICCC, supra note 48, at Project Description. 
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and short descriptions."2'3:3 The project- aims to allow states to 
comply with the protections of the Uniform Collateral Conse-
quences of Conviction Act. 2:i 1 That act recognized the disorganized 
nature of collateral consequences in the federal code and state 
laws, which rendered awareness nearly impossible for defense 
counsel and other participants in the criminal justice system.235 
The result of the project is an online, searchable database that 
lists the collateral consequences, whether automatic or discre-
tionary, implicated by a particular criminal charge. 
The ABA's project is commendable and will undeniably assist 
defense attorneys in particular circumstances, and over time. But 
while more resources may be available, the volume problem will 
always remain as legislatures continue to enact new collateral 
consequences and courts expand Padilla. The burden will rest 
almost entirely on defense counsel and unaware defendants will 
rely entirely on the competence and zeal of defense counsel.236 
Other actors within the system will not be made any more aware 
of the collateral consequences that should affect calculations of 
due process in a system dominated by pleas. 
3. Budgetary and Resource Issues 
Even if the doctrinal and practical issues identified above could 
be addressed, resource deficiencies remain and expansion of the 
right to counsel would remain subject to the political will within 
legislatures. The Court has not expanded the constitutional right 
to counsel since Scott. 2'31 This leaves expansion to legislatures and 
state constitutions. While a few states already go beyond the re-
233. Id. 
234. See id. (indicating that the project helps states save time and money); see, e.g., 
Missouri v. Petterson, 780 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (range of punishment); 
Deutscher v. Nevada, 601 P.2d 407, 414 (Nev. 1979) (ability to waive the right to counsel); 
Wilkins v. Maryland, 245 A.2d 80, 84 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968) (right to counsel). Notice 
how the sentencing information relates to direct consequences. While a defendant's in-
person presence at an arraignment often can be waived, or his appearance entirely, the 
information must find its way to the defendant. 
235. See ABA, NI CCC, supra note 48, at Project Description ("Of particular relevance in 
the present context is the fact that collateral consequences are scattered throughout the 
codebooks and frequently unknown even to those responsible for their administration and 
enforcement."). 
236. See Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 150 (2012) [hereinafter Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining]. 
237. See King, supra note 11, at 6, 15. 
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quirements of Scott and afford a broader right to counsel, 238 im-
plementation of the federal guarantees remains a work in pro-
gress.239 The right heralded in Gideon remains, to some degree, an 
unfunded mandate and there is no guarantee that doctrinal ex-
pansion of the scope of the right would change that reality. 210 Yet 
there are few, if any, public defender organizations that would re-
fuse additional resources. 
Generally, financial support for indigent counsel in America 
lags behind that in other developed countries. 211 Twenty years af-
ter Gideon, only 1.5% of total expenditures for the entire criminal 
justice system went to defense services. 212 Funding has increased, 
but remains insufficient. 21 '3 In 2005, the fifty states combined 
spent $5.3 billion on indigent defense. 211 This funding is spent in 
vastly different ways because the Court has not mandated how 
the right to counsel must be implemented.215 In most states, the 
state government funds a particular indigent defense program.216 
A substantial number still shift financial burdens to counties 
within the state, which can result in local inequities based on per 
• • 2-17 capita income. 
Unsurprisingly, indigent defense is not the most popular pro-
ject to fund, especially in a time of economic uncertainty. Thus, 
funding sources are often specialized, which also results in un-
238. See, e.g., OH. CONST. art. I§ 11; Gaffey v. State, 637 P.2d 634, 636 (1981) (indicat-
ing that the right to counsel exists for any criminal defendant regardless of whether im-
prisonment is imposed, even including a right to counsel for minor traffic infractions). 
239. Andrew Cohen, How Americans Lost the Right to Counsel, 50 Years After 'Gideon,' 
A'l'LANTIC (Mar. 13, 2013 11:09 AM) http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/ 
03/how-americans-lost-the-right-to-counscl-50-years-after-gideon/273433/ ("Over the in-
tervening half-century, Congress and state lawmakers consistently have refused to fund 
public defenders' offices adequately. And, as it has become more conservative since 1963, 
the United States Supreme Court has refused to force legislators to do so."). 
240. See Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and 
the Neer], for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 8-13 (2004). 
241. See id. at 922-24 (comparing legal aid in England with the United States); see also 
AM. BAH Ass'N, CHIMINAL .JUSTICE IN CmsIS: A REPORT TO THE AMEHICAN PEOPLE AND THE 
AMEHICAN BAH ON CHIMINAL JUS'l'ICE IN 'l'HE UNI'l'ED S'l'A'l'ES: SOME MYTHS, SO!v!E 
REALITIES, AND SO!v!E QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 39-44 (1988). 
242. See AM. BAR Ass'N, GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING 1 
(1983). 
243. Id. at 7. 
244. Id. at 7-8. 
245. Id. 
246. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 228, at 54. 
247. Id. at 54-55. 
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predictability.218 Funds also can be collected by increasing costs 
elsewhere in the criminal system, which can lead to crippling fi. 
nancial collateral consequences for the indigent. 219 Furthermore 
' expansion of the right to counsel in non-criminal contexts has un. 
fortunately drained resources that were once allocated for crimi. 
nal defense services.250 
The political will to financially support defense programs has 
deteriorated as the economy has struggled.251 Several states de. 
creased the amount of financial support in the mid-2000s. 252 In 
2009, twenty-two of thirty-seven states facing budget shortfalls 
were solely responsible for funding statewide defense programs.253 
When the belt must be tightened, defense programs are one of the 
first programs to go by the wayside. 254 Most significant for this ar-
ticle is the reality that the inequities between budgets for profes-
sional prosecutors and for defense programs remain despite fund-
ing difficulties overall, which renders the Court's statements in 
Argersinger about fairness somewhat hollow.255 
4. Summary: More "Represented" Defendants, but the Problems 
and Burdens Remain 
There is no question that expansion of the right to counsel 
would allow more defendants to receive counsel. Expansion also 
would, by definition, incorporate effectiveness of counsel juris-
prudence into the equation. As combating collateral consequences 
illiteracy is the main objective, it is arguable that forging a path 
solely through the Sixth Amendment is inadequate. Defense pro-
grams are already overwhelmed with bloated caseloads and insuf-
ficient funding. Mandating expansion of the right to counsel does 
not resolve this resource problem, and perhaps could exacerbate 
248. Id. at 57 & n.50 (describing how Wisconsin created a program earmarking funds 
for indigent defense, with a projection of $7 million, and raised less than $100,000). 
249. See id. at 57-58. 
250. Id. at 74. 
251. HOLLY R. STEVENS ET AL., STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR 
INDIGENT DEFENSE SrmVICES FISCAL YEAR 2008 6-7 (2010). 
252. See id. at 59. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 59-60 (describing state programs that sacrificed staff and other resources 
due to trimmed state budgets). 
255. Id. at 61-62 (discussing significant disparities in overall budget, grants, and sala-
ries in various states); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33-37 (1972). 
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it. In other words, an expanded right could simply result in an 
unfilled promise. 
But even assuming that the funding and resource deficiencies 
could be addressed, attempting to increase notice of collateral 
consequences through expansion of Padilla is tantamount to at-
tacking an iceberg with a single ice pick. While many are hopeful 
for the expansion of Padilla to other collateral consequences, the 
process will be incremental at best. Differences of opinion be-
tween circuits and states will remain. Clarity is unlikely. And 
even if Padilla is expanded, the heightened Strickland standard 
potentially mitigates any gains. 
These realities expose reliance on Padilla and its progeny as 
the primary means for combating unawareness of collateral con-
sequences. At its root, the issue is one of legal illiteracy that is 
present throughout the criminal system amongst various partici-
pants involved in crafting justice. Therefore, any solution to the 
problem must go beyond the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment 
to reach other components of the justice system. Expansion of the 
right to counsel as a prophylactic measure is a step in the right 
direction, but it is not enough and exempts too many players, all 
while increasing burdens on perpetually overwhelmed defense 
counsel. Hence, a broader solution is necessary: notice must be 
extended beyond the duties of counsel in order to effectively edu-
cate prosecutors, judges, defendants, defense counsel, police offic-
ers, and any other individuals that are involved in crafting jus-
tice. Extending notice also will bring additional obligations for 
these players. The next section suggests possible avenues for be-
ginning this task and calls for further study, specifically drawing 
on solutions to illiteracy in other fields. 
IV. SYSTEMIC SOLUTIONS THAT ENSURE NOTICE OF COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES 
Because expansion of the right to counsel is likely insufficient 
for combating the problem of collateral consequences illiteracy, 
any solution must account for the various players involved in the 
administration of criminal justice. This part argues for increased 
involvement from the two most visible players: judges and prose-
cutors. Because prosecutors are essentially the "architects" of 
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criminal proceedings, 256 it is only fitting that they contribute to 
greater awareness of indirect consequences for individual defend-
ants, the system, and themselves. Furthermore, with the excep-
tion of the rare case that proceeds to trial and requires judicial 
gatekeeping, trial judges are heavily involved in the processing of 
guilty pleas. 257 As vital guardians of due process, they are in a 
unique position to contribute to systemic literacy. Because both 
prosecutors and judges do not relate to the defendant in terms of 
advocacy, this article calls for disclosure-like obligations from 
both at various stages of the process that already exists. 
A. Formalizing Notice from the Judiciary 
In a system dominated by pleas, there are two encounters be-
tween judges and defendants that are ripe for notice of collateral 
consequences: arraignment and the moment of the entry of a 
guilty plea. Both command undivided attention from the defend-
ant, primarily because they represent the beginning and the end 
of a prosecution. 
1. Arraignment 
Arraignment, whether preliminary or formal, is the moment 
when a defendant appears before a judge and is apprised of pend-
ing charges filed against the defendant.258 It involves an acknowl-
edgment of jurisdiction, information about the offenses charged, 
and a request for entry of a plea. Again, notice is the primary un-
dercurrent at this stage, which is a "critical stage" of the prosecu-
tion.259 Most state arraignment procedures require judges to in-
form a defendant of certain rights, such as the right to counsel, as 
well as possible sentences.260 
256. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963). 
257. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(c)(3)-(5) (addressing the involvement of a trial judge 
in the acceptance or denial of a plea agreement). 
258. See generally Arraignment in the Court of Common Pleas, DEL. STATE CTS., 
http://courts.delaware.gov/help/proceedings/ccp_crarraignment.stm (last visited Apr. 3, 
2015). 
259. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961). 
260. See, e.g., Missouri v. Petterson, 780 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (range of pun-
ishment); Deutscher v. Nevada, 601 P.2d 407 (Nev. 1979) (right to counsel); Wilkins v. 
Maryland, 245 A.2d 80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968) (right to counsel). Notice how the sen-
tencing information relates to direct consequences. While a defendant's in-person presence 
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The information received by a defendant at arraignment-
whether in person or after waiving an appearance-can make a 
defendant aware of what may result in the event of a conviction. 
Hearing the possible collateral consequences from a judge and in-
cluding them in court paperwork attached to the charging docu-
ments can heighten individual literacy and cause a defendant to 
become aware, from the start, of considerations that should be 
part of the guilty plea calculus. In other words, notice of collateral 
consequences provides an additional frame for the defendant to 
view the case through. Such notice would likely provoke conver-
sations with defense counsel that may otherwise not occur due to 
the difficulties that were articulated above. Defendants-
especially those encountering the system for the first time-
would have information that allows them to be proactive rather 
than reactive given the likelihood of a plea offer in the pipeline. 
Having this information come from the court also adds an ele-
ment of legitimacy to the reality of those consequences. It self-
informs the judge and also may inform a prosecutor who happens 
to be present. The information can become a vital aspect of a de-
fendant's thought process simply by being more present. 
Admittedly, one criticism of adding notice to this phase of the 
process is that arraignments have become largely rote proce-
dures.261 While they may be rote for some, they certainly are not 
for all, especially the defendant unfamiliar with the criminal sys-
tem and who retains awe for the judiciary. Furthermore, rote or 
not, it is undeniable that the current aspects of the arraignment 
process have heightened literacy with respect to the right to 
counsel and the right to a trial. It is not unreasonable to suppose 
that notice of collateral consequences would result in a similar ef-
fect across the board. 
Another possible criticism is that it is impossible to predict the 
number of collateral consequences applicable to a particular de-
fendant at this phase of the game. But this criticism mistakes the 
judicial role at the time of arraignment. Judges are not tasked 
with giving individual advice; rather, they are tasked with giving 
at an arraignment often can be waived, or his appearance entirely, the information must 
find its way to the defendant. 
261. K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggres-
sive Order Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
Soc. CHANGE 271, 295 (2009). 
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individuals information. And information about collateral conse-
quences is often charge-based rather than individual-based.262 In 
other words, technological advancements make it possible to in-
dex consequences as they relate to charges. While the number 
may be high and render in-person notice administered by a judge 
potentially impractical, it is foreseeable that a catalog of the pos-
sible consequences could be attached to the charging infor-
mation.263 
A related criticism stems from the fact that some collateral 
consequences are automatic and others are discretionary,
261 
thereby making it too difficult to provide notice in a particular 
situation. Admittedly, this is a more difficult problem to grapple 
with than the former. However, it also assumes too much respon-
sibility for a judge. Rather, arraignment could be reserved for 
mentioning those collateral consequences that could result by op· 
eration of law. Notice as to discretionary collateral consequences, 
such as in the field of employment, could be present, but less spe-
cific. Because the goal is heightening systemic literacy, mere 
mention of the discretionary consequences will likely raise a de-
fendant's eyebrow as he or she approaches resolution of the case. 
Put simply, heightening awareness of collateral consequences at 
the arraignment phase plants the seed for future consideration of 
those consequences. It also will increase judicial awareness, 
which could be helpful when a judge is evaluating the due process 
standards associated with a plea that occurs later in the case. 
2. Inclusion of "Automatic" Consequences in Pleas 
As described above, courts are already tasked with ensuring 
that guilty pleas meet certain due process standards under the 
262. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text. 
263. See Chin, Making Padilla Practical, supra note 227 at 685 ("[I]t is perfectly rea-
sonable to anticipate that the legal system, somehow, will ~ee to it that research is done 
that can be shared with all participants in the criminal justice system."). The "index" could 
be fully disseminated in the charging documents or court paperwork given to the defend-
ant. An abbreviated version that identifies the most prevalent collateral consequences as-
sociated with particular charges could be delivered in person by the judge. Which conse-
quences to include in the in-person communication would be jurisdiction specific and 
based on analyses conducted on that subject in each jurisdiction. In other words, each 
state could study which charges are most frequently resulting in convictions and which 
collateral consequences correlate to those charges. 
264. See ABA, NICCC, supra note 48, at Project Description. 
~-------- d 
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Fifth Amendment. Adding notice of consequences at the time of a 
plea can have similar effects to increased notice at the time of ar-
raignment because defendants will be reminded of the conse-
quences of their decision prior to formalizing ancl living with it 
beyond the withdrawal period. 
Jenny Roberts suggested as much when considering the practi-
cability of adding notice to pleas: 
Courts are already charged with ensuring that a guilty plea is know-
ing, voluntary, and intelligent. Just as defense counsel are able to 
ask a few more questions to determine if counseling about one or 
more collateral consequences is necessary, so too can the courts 
make minor adjustments to their plea allocution processes to protect 
such important rights.
265 
In other words, guilty plea colloquies-both written and with 
the judiciary-can be instruments of increasing literacy. Interest-
ingly, this arguably might heighten literacy and the knowingness 
of pleas at a lower cost than leaning on defense counsel. 266 More 
importantly, post-Padilla, it would recognize the complementary 
guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 267 Whereas de-
fense counsel can level the playing field strategically, the judici-
ary can at least ensure that all parties are as informed as they 
should be. Padilla resisted importing the collateral consequences 
rule into the Sixth Amendment context; if awareness of such con-
sequences truly is a systemic literacy issue, it makes sense to in-
volve courts in the effort. 
Recall that Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion in Padilla, 
suggested as much when referring to creative, legislative ways to 
address the issue. 268 In fact, the ABA standards already urge 
courts and legislatures "to make notice of particular sanctions a 
condition of a valid plea."269 And at the time Padilla was decided, 
265. Roberts, supra note 22, at 699. 
266. Wikstrom, supra note 231, at 370 & n.131 (citing Justice Scalia's dissent for the 
Proposition that the Court could have leaned on Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
tnent to require notice of collateral consequences in the guilty plea colloquy). 
267. See Lang, supra note 219, at 952-54. 
268. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 382-83 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring). 
269. Love, supra note 221, at 118, 119 & n.164; AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA 81'ANDARDS FOR 
C!UMJNAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF 
CONVICTED PERSONS 28 (3d ed. 2004). 
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some states had added notice of immigration consequences to the 
11 270 plea co oquy. 
Aside from the due process aspect of this proposal, tasking 
judges with notice will contribute to systemic literacy. Like at the 
arraignment phase, judges will become more aware. Similarly, 
whereas prosecutors may be absent at arraignment, they are 
never absent from the moment a plea is entered. Hearing judges 
announce the pertinent collateral consequences, on the record, as 
they relate to a particular charge, will cumulatively heighten 
prosecutorial awareness and possibly lead to more appropriate 
plea offers depending on other considerations related to a case.211 
In fairness, many of the same criticisms that apply to adding 
notice requirements at arraignment apply to adding them to 
guilty plea colloquies. 272 The volume, depth, and mechanical prob-
lems are the same, although arguably linking consequences to 
charges rather than individual circumstances avoids the issue in 
most cases.273 That approach also would preserve the distinction 
between the judiciary's informative role and defense counsel's ad-
vocacy role. Blurring those roles would be inappropriate.211 To be 
clear, this proposal does not ask a judge to advise; instead, it calls 
270. Lang, supra note 219, at 962-63. 
271. See Love, supra note 221, at 117 n.158 ("A just and fair prosecutor will consider 
the collateral consequences that may apply in a particular case and take them into ac-
count when considering a disposition."). 
272. See Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining 
Process, 32 HOFSTHA L. REV. 1349, 1401 (2004) ("[A]ny participant in the criminal justice 
system knows that the colloquy between the judge and the defendant is scripted, ritualis-
tic, perfunctory, pro forma, and quite meaningless."); Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining 
and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 460 (2008) ("[I]n many cases, the rituals sur-
rounding plea acceptance and sentencing lack real significance as decision making pro-
cesses .... Procedural justice in these contexts may thus appear an empty formality and 
serve only to highlight the absence of procedural justice in reaching the plea deal."). 
273. See Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 33, at 1158. 
("Checklists or computer programs could flag typical collateral consequences of which de-
fense lawyers must warn, based on each defendant's charges, jurisdiction, immigration 
status, address, and job."). 
274. See Lang, supra note 219, at 986 ("A judge cannot satisfactorily investigate the 
defendant's individual situation, gauge the importance of plea consequences to the de-
fendant, and advise the defendant based on that information. That is the province of an 
attorney: the defendant's advocate."); see also Ewald & Smith, supra note 115, at 155 (dis-
cussing how judges in the survey firmly believed that it is the responsibility of counsel to 
advise). 
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on judges to issue notice at various stages of the process to re-
mind all parties involved (defense counsel, defendant, and prose-
cutor) of anterior considerations when crafting justice.275 
The form of notice would consist of additional warnings specific 
to the most prevalent collateral consequences related to a particu-
lar charge in the particular jurisdiction. These warnings would 
exist in the written and verbal colloquies. In the courtroom, the 
judge would notify the defendant of the most prevalent, automat-
ic consequences that stem from a particular charge, ask the de-
fendant whether he has discussed the import of those conse-
quences with counsel, and, if not, allow the defendant time to do 
so before formally entering the plea. Because the plea colloquy 
would contain those same consequences, defense counsel would, 
as a matter of best practice, likely begin discussing those conse-
quences with a defendant before appearing in front of the judge. 
But regardless of whether the discussion with counsel occurs be-
fore or after appearing in front of the judge, the defendant re-
ceives knowledge that is currently not mandatory prior to enter-
ing the plea. Perhaps most importantly, he receives it from 
multiple sources-the colloquy, the judge, and defense counsel-
thereby contributing to institutional literacy.276 
Determining which consequences a court should share at the 
time a plea is entered is the most difficult conceptual problem, 
given the myriad consequences that could apply to a particular 
situation, especially in jurisdictions beyond the specific court.277 
Attempting to craft doctrine that gauges seriousness as it per-
tains to a defendant's particular circumstances may run into seri-
ous "hindsight is 20/20" problems during post-conviction litiga-
tion.278 This is an area where a proposal cannot seek too much at 
275. See Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining supra note 236, at 164 ("The quasi-
market forces at work encourage all parties involved to work together to achieve plea bar-
gains that benefit all parties directly involved."). 
276. The unique role of the prosecutor is discussed below. See infra Part IV.B. 
277. Love, supra note 221, at 100 ("[A] court cannot, and perhaps should not, be ex-
pected to know what consequences might be important to a particular criminal defendant 
by virtue of some personal characteristic or circumstance, such as citizenship or employ-
ment or residence."); see also Colleen F. Shanahan, Significant Entanglements: A Frame-
work for the Civil Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1392 
(2012) (noting the difficulty in determining which consequences are worth including and 
proposing a test that focuses on whether the consequence "significantly entangles" the civ-
il and criminal Jaw). 
278. Bibas and Roberts have proposed tests for determining which consequences should 
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the risk of achieving doctrine that is impossible to -institute on the 
ground. For that reason, inclusion of automatic consequences in 
guilty plea colloquies is the most viable step. Automatic conse-
quences would include those consequences that operate by the 
particular state and federal law as a result of a particular convic-
tion for a specific charge; for example, a particular charge may 
bar entry into a particular field or render someone ineligible for 
certain benefits. Furthermore, automatic consequences would in-
clude any immediate loss or deprivation of a substantive due pro-
cess right, such as the right to vote. Because those rights are ei-
ther enumerated or for the most part already explicated by 
courts, the list would not be endless or run the risk of assessing a 
defendant's particular situation. If this list remains too long, one 
solution would be to further qualify the standard to include only 
those consequences that would likely continue to affect the of-
fender beyond expiration of the direct sentence.279 Further, the list 
would also only include the consequences that are particular to 
the state where the prosecution occurred and under federal law, 
as qualified above. One can envision how each state might be bet-
ter suited to determine which consequences appear the most, 
based on which charges are the most frequent sources of convic-
tions. 280 
Finally, practically achieving notice of automatic consequences 
would not be as difficult as some may think: once such conse-
quences are catalogued on a charge-by-charge basis, making them 
part of written plea colloquies that will be executed in the pres-
ence of defense counsel would be possible. And once they are part 
be included. Roberts suggests the following standard: "[W]henever a reasonable person in 
the defendant's situation would deem knowledge of th[at] consequence, penal or otherwise, 
to be a significant factor in deciding whether to plead guilty." Roberts, supra note 22, at 
674. Bibas, similarly, suggests the following: "[W]hether [the consequence] is severe 
enough and certain enough to be a significant factor in criminal defendant's bargaining 
calculus." Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1147. 
279. Shanahan develops this concept when she states, "Where a legislature has chosen 
to make the conviction operate past the imposed sentence of incarceration or fine through 
another civil consequence, without any additional process, the legislature is likely to have 
created sufficient entanglement under this framework." See Shanahan, supra note 277, at 
1416. 
280. States could determine the quantity of offenders convicted of a particular offense 
that remain in the state, which would in turn inform which consequences within that ju-
risdiction are likely to be most prevalent. Interestingly, this approach has a nice federal-
ism component to it. States can be laboratories of democracy. New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
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of the colloquy, defense counsel will be forced to explain them, or 
at the minimum, answer any possible questions or concerns from 
defendants. It presents a classic case of "putting things in writ-
ing." Judges also would see these colloquies, question the defend-
ant and defense counsel about their contents, and assess the va-
lidity of the plea, all things considered. 
B. The Role of the Prosecutor: A Brady-Lihe Solution for 
Collateral Consequences 
As the Supreme Court conceded in Brady v. Maryland, prose-
cutors are the "architects" of criminal proceedings.281 Brady re-
quires prosecutors to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence 
that is material to guilt or innocence.282 While Brady was decided 
when trials still dominated the Court's jurisprudence in terms of 
criminal procedure, this assertion remains true in a system dom-
inated by guilty pleas. Arguably, the hands of the prosecutor are 
even more involved today, given the prevalence of negotiated 
pleas and the rarity that is a trial. This reality has led to calls for 
prosecutorial awareness of collateral consequences in order to 
positively influence the administration of justice.283 In a largely 
unregulated bargaining market,28·1 it only makes sense that prose-
cutorial behavior be regulated as it relates to furnishing infor-
mation about collateral consequences. Considering that such con-
281. 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963). 
282. Id. at 86-88. 
283. Robert M.A. Johnson, Message from the President, PROSECUTOR, May-June 2001, 
at 5 (noting how prosecutors "must consider [collateral consequences] if we are to see that 
justice is done. How can we ignore a consequence of our prosecution that we know will 
surely be imposed by the operation of law?"). Commentators often cite professional stand-
ards when emphasizing that prosecutors are tasked with seeking justice rather than simp-
ly convictions. See e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, RECOMMENDATION at 4-5 (Feb. 12, 2007) (citing 
Robert M.A. Johnson, Message from the President: Collateral Consequences, THE 
PROSECUTOR 5 (2001)); NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS Ass'N, NA'l'IONAL PROSECUTION 
STANDAHDS § 1-1.1 (3d ed. 2009), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%2 
03rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20Commentary.pdf ("The primary responsibility of prose-
cution is to see that justice is accomplished."); see also id. ("The primary responsibility of a 
prosecutor is to seek justice."). 
284. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1153 ("It is 
astonishing that a $100 credit-card purchase of a microwave oven is regulated more care-
fully than a guilty plea that results in years of imprisonment."). The market also is unreg-
ulated in the sense that fifty states administer prosecutions differently. Hence, "there is 
little organized effort to develop consistent or progressive criminal justice policy." Robert 
M.A. Johnson, A Prosecutor's Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. Lours U. 
Pun. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2011). 
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sequences are attempts by legislatures to curtail an offender's 
freedom post-conviction in an indirect way, and prosecutors are 
tasked with enforcing the criminal law that can lead to those con-
sequences, it follows that prosecutors should contribute to aware-
ness of them.28'' 
The Court's decision in Brady provides an opening for expan-
sion of the prosecutorial role in this context. In Brady, the Court 
noted how "[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted 
but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administra-
tion of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly."286 
With that holding, Brady "launched the modern development of 
constitutional disclosure requirements."287 
Fast forward to the administration of a plea-dominated system 
today, and Brady's disclosure obligations in the evidentiary con-
text related to the right to trial under the Sixth Amendment 
could be transplanted with respect to awareness of collateral con-
sequences. Coupling Brady's holding with Padilla's recognition 
that guilty pleas dominate the system allows for an expanded role 
for prosecutors if fairness in the administration of justice is to 
remain a priority. Just as prosecutors "shape a trial that bears 
heavily on the defendant," they also are the primary mover when 
it comes to resolving cases with a guilty plea. 288 Prosecutors have 
total authority to adjust charges and to decide which charge to of-
fer as a part of a plea bargain.289 In this respect, prosecutors could 
be tasked with informing defendants of automatic collateral con-
sequences when extending plea offers, especially if a defendant is 
proceeding pro se. 290 In practice, prosecutors could be required to 
285. In other words, collateral consequences result from prosecutorial enforcement of 
the criminal law. Thus, prosecutors, tasked with the administration of justice, should 
know more about the consequences of their decisions. 
286. 373 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added). 
287. Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 
686 (2006). 
288. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963). 
289. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Marhet, supra note 33, at 1128 ("A range of 
possible overlapping charges can fit a single transaction or episode, and prosecutors have 
discretion to choose among them to reflect their own senses of justice, their desires to 
achieve pleas, or any number of reasons."). This proposal also leaves room for educating 
police officers about the ramifications of charging in the first place. 
290. This is especially important in lower-level misdemeanor prosecutions involving 
defendants who may not qualify for counsel due to their income or because of the current 
right to counsel doctrine. 
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furnish- a written plea offer with a list of the automatic conse-
quences pertaining to a particular charge.291 Dare one say that 
such an obligation would be too practically difficult. It has al-
ready been done post-Padilla in the Second Circuit with respect 
to immigration consequences and notice of potential sentencing 
enhancements should a defendant re-offend.292 
The legal basis for such an obligation could come in the form of 
a constitutional command, a la Brady, state-specific legislative ef-
forts, or ethical obligations under the rules of professional con-
duct for prosecutors. A constitutional command would amplify the 
seriousness of collateral consequences in the spirit of Padilla. 
However, it would likely take several cases to flesh out the pre-
cise meaning and scope of such a command. Hence, an affirmative 
constitutional obligation, while incredibly forceful, would run the 
risk of resulting in the same problems mentioned above regarding 
the development of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence 
post-Padilla. 
Because state jurisdictions are the best equipped to determine 
which collateral consequences under their particular codes are 
most prevalent, one possibility is jurisdiction-specific legislative 
action that creates disclosure requirements by statute. Disclosure 
obligations imposed by statute would heighten awareness imme-
diately and may not be subject to as many "fleshing out" problems 
that come with a broader constitutional command. On the other 
hand, such efforts would remain the product of political will and 
subject to the same budgetary constraints plaguing most local 
governments. Considering that the plight of criminal defendants 
rarely serves as persuasive motivation for legislative action, lean-
ing on the possibility of legislative prescriptions might be wishful 
thinking. A more realistic jurisdiction-specific goal may be advo-
cating for changes in the rules of professional conduct on a state-
by-state basis. Expanded ethical obligations could develop from 
291. Admittedly, the same cataloguing concerns that are present with notice by the ju-
diciary exist here. However, this author is confident that projects such as that undertaken 
by the ABA Collateral Consequences Project, plus technology, could make furnishing this 
information fairly simple with the aid of institutional memory. 
292. N.Y.C. BAR Ass'N, PADILLA v. KENTUCKY: THE NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT 
SYSTEM, ONE YEAR LATER 6 (2011), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/up 
loads/PadillaCrimCtsCJOReportFINAL6.15.11.pdf; see United States v. Pimentel, 932 
F.2d 1029, 1034 (2d Cir. 1991) (suggesting prosecutors send a letter to the defense explain-
ing how conviction on a particular charge could affect sentencing for a future conviction). 
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state-driven studies about which collateral consequences are most 
prevalent in the particular jurisdiction. Because any modification 
to the rules of professional conduct would- likely involve input 
from many members of the bar, the need for extra-legal literacy 
efforts would become more apparent to attorneys as well. 293 
Hence, a combined approach of heightened ethical obligations for 
prosecutors and extra-legal literacy measures may be the most 
realistic and practical solution to heightening literacy institu-
tionally and individually. With the support of state and local gov-
ernment, these efforts could be uniquely tailored to the most 
commonly felt collateral consequences in the particular jurisdic-
tion. 
Regardless of the source of the obligation, the effect of such a 
requirement cannot be understated in terms of heightening liter-
acy overall. Again, such a practice likely would heighten literacy 
for all parties and make prosecutors generally more aware of 
what types of consequences result, thereby allowing for individu-
ally tailored offers. Prosecutors, constantly in conversation with 
defense counsel, would become more aware of consequences gen-
erally and more aware of their application in particular circum-
stances. Prosecutorial disclosure also would assist defense coun-
sel when advising clients, especially if defense counsel was 
unaware of a particular consequence. Increasing awareness on 
both sides of the bargain comports with the Court's statement in 
Padilla about creative crafting of plea deals. 291 And in theory, 
prosecutorial awareness and disclosure could lead to better sys-
temic results for both sides: defendants might receive better plea 
deals overall and prosecutors may dispose of more cases through 
the plea process when defendants feel they can maintain a liveli-
hood despite a conviction. Finally, heightened systemic aware-
ness of collateral consequences could result in a deterrent effect 
293. Consider how the legal profession could look to health literacy projects that corre-
spond to particular problems in particular places for possible guidance in this field. Just as 
a particular city may have certain health illiteracy problems, a particular jurisdiction like-
ly has certain legal illiteracy problems. 
294. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010). When both sides at the negotiating 
table are aware of what is at stake for the defendant, the underlying facts, and serious-
ness of the crime, the opportunity for a well-crafted plea is better. 
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that is not fully felt when such consequences remain in the 
dark.295 
CONCLUSION 
Awareness of collateral consequences is a systemic literacy is-
sue that requires a multi-player solution. The Supreme Court's 
admission in Padilla and Frye that plea-bargaining is now the 
dominant method of resolving a criminal case led to increased re-
sponsibilities for defense counsel to be considered effective. But 
attacking this literacy problem with only one party mirrors cut-
ting the grass with a pair of scissors. Tasking an already over-
burdened, under-funded, and ill-resourced defense bar with en-
suring notice of such consequences cannot be the only avenue of 
redress. Increasing the number of cases that require counsel will 
remain subject to the same legislative will and budgetary issues 
that currently confront the right to counsel fifty years after Gide-
on. Put simply, more than expansion of the right to counsel is 
necessary. 
Fortunately, the criminal system contains other able-bodied ac-
tors that can contribute to eradicating systemic illiteracy of col-
lateral consequences. Judges, who now process pleas significantly 
more than presiding over trials, can serve informative roles at 
various stages of a prosecution. Prosecutors, who offer plea bar-
gains and exchange ideas about resolving cases with defense 
counsel, also can heighten notice in the plea-bargaining context 
by disclosing indirect consequences linked to specific charges. 
These repetitive efforts will lead to broader awareness amongst 
all players, thereby contributing to a fairer administration of jus-
tice that comports with the complementary guarantees of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
295. Ewald & Smith, supra note 115, at 161 ("It is possible that given such variation 
[in discussion of collateral consequences in courtrooms], these sanctions today are not im-
posed clearly, publicly, and consistently enough to function as the kind of 'expressive' or 
'shaming penalties' some advocates presumably have in mind."). 
